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            From the Director . . .
This year marks the 37th year the Center for Business 
and Economic Research (CBER) has published the 
Kentucky Annual Economic Report.  This report is one of 
the important ways that the Center fulfills its mandated 
mission to examine various aspects of the Kentucky 
economy.  The 2009 report contains six articles.  These 
articles cover a wide variety of topics from the expected 
growth of Kentucky and the national economy to the 
examination of citizens’ preferences for the state budget. 
As we have done in previous years in this annual report, 
we focus on important issues that face citizens and policy 
makers in the state such as: the 2008 financial crisis, 
differences in income between rural and urban portions 
of the state, and manufacturers’ attitudes toward the 
future.
In putting together this issue, we have drawn on the 
expertise of the faculty, staff and former graduate students 
at the University of Kentucky.  Contributors include six 
UK faculty members, an economic analyst, and a former 
graduate student who is now a faculty member at Valdosta 
State University.  As has been the tradition for this report, 
we have assembled some of the best economists in the state 
to write about important regional and national issues.
Our lead article is by Dr. Donald J. Mullineaux, a 
Professor of Finance.  His article discusses the causes and 
consequences of the 2008 financial crisis, with a particular 
emphasis on the role of innovations in the financial sector. 
Dr. Mullineaux discusses how the financial situation 
grew from a small problem to a large one and whether 
the situation could have been avoided.  He also provides 
comments on the initial policy responses to the crisis. 
I contributed an article that looks back at the 
performance of the national and state economies over the 
recent period and provides forecasts for the coming year. 
My forecast for the U.S. is that the economy will contract by 
0.5 percent for all of 2009, that unemployment will average 
8 percent for the year—which would be the highest rate 
since the 1982-84 recession—and that there will be almost 
no change in prices.  My forecast for Kentucky is that the 
State’s economy will grow by approximately 0.5 percent 
in 2009 but that the unemployment rate in Kentucky will 
average 8.2 percent for the year and will be slightly above 
the unemployment rate for the nation.  
Dr. Brandon Koford, an Assistant Professor of 
Economics at Valdosta State University, examines citizens’ 
preferences for public spending categories in Kentucky’s 
budget using a survey of Kentucky residents in 2007. 
The top budget priority for Kentuckians is education; 
health care is also a high priority.  The ranking of citizens’ 
priorities closely matches the ranking of actual spending, 
although citizens are more equitable in their proposed 
distribution of funding than the 
state.  
The fourth article is by Dr. 
Alison Davis, an Assistant Professor 
of Agricultural Economics.  This 
article looks at differences in incomes 
between rural and urban portions of 
Kentucky.  Dr. Davis documents 
differences in demographics, 
agriculture, education, quality-of-life indicators, and 
economic indicators.  Her findings suggest that the lower 
level of income in Kentucky’s rural counties is related to 
low levels of education, labor-force participation, and 
health insurance coverage.
The fifth article in the report is by Dr. John Garen, the 
chair of the Department of Economics, Christopher Jepsen, 
an Assistant Professor of Economics and the Associate 
Director of CBER, and Dr. Frank Scott, a Gatton Professor 
of Economics.  In this article Drs. Garen, Jepsen, and Scott 
examine the aluminum industry in Kentucky.  They look 
at recent trends in employment, salaries, productivity, and 
safety.  The authors find that employment and earnings 
have remained steady or declined, whereas productivity 
has increased.  Safety statistics have shown no clear 
pattern.
The final article in the report is written by Anna 
Stewart, an economic analyst at CBER.  In this article Ms. 
Stewart reports on the results of the annual survey of 
business confidence that CBER conducts for the Kentucky 
Association of Manufacturers.  This survey asks businesses 
about their performance over the past year and their 
expectation about the coming year.  The survey results 
suggest that business owners are becoming increasingly 
pessimistic about the growth in manufacturing in 
Kentucky in the coming year.  
In the past year, we have worked on a number of 
important projects at the Center for Business and Economic 
Research.  One project we recently completed examined 
recent changes in the revenue sources used to finance 
K-12 education and the impact these changes have on 
the allocation of expenditures.  A companion report, 
set to come out in January 2009, will examine whether 
changes in revenue sources has any impact of educational 
outcomes.  In another report we examined the model used 
in Kentucky to obtain child support orders and whether 
the existing model needs to be modified or updated. 
Finally, we also recently completed a report examining 
the impact that increasing tuition has on enrollments in 
community and technical colleges.  In the coming year we 
anticipate completing several new project we believe will 
address some of the important problems facing Kentucky. 
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the global economy. We suggest that each of the causal elements can be viewed as examples of “innovation 
gone awry.” We explain how what appeared to be a relatively small, fairly localized problem relative to the 
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rate in Kentucky will average 8.2 percent for the year and will be slightly above the unemployment rate for the nation. 
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Anatomy of the Financial Crisis  
of 2008
Donald J. Mullineaux
Introduction
The year 2008 will go down in the annals of 
economic history as the year of the worst financial 
crisis to hit the United States (and the rest of the 
globe) since the Great Depression. The crisis has 
taken a major toll on the financial system, reflected 
in the demise of large investment banks such as 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the fall of large 
commercial banks such as Washington Mutual and 
Indy Mac, and the general loss of credit available 
from traditional providers. The overall economy has 
not been spared, and the recession now underway 
is expected to last through the better part of 2009, 
which would make it the longest downturn since 
the 1930s. Not surprisingly, many have asked, 
Why and how did this happen? Who or what is 
to blame? The media, with its penchant for pithy 
explanations for complicated issues, has pointed to 
“deregulation” and “greedy executives” at financial 
institutions as the main causes and primary culprits 
behind the financial meltdown. In this article, we 
suggest that deregulation played very little role in 
fomenting the crisis. The main cause, in one word, 
was innovation. Usually we think of innovation as 
a good thing, and it is, for the most part. But, as is 
the case with, say, wine and chocolate, there can be 
too much of a good thing. No doubt at least partly 
motivated by greed, financial executives pushed 
the financial innovation envelope beyond the 
boundaries of rationality. But they were aided and 
abetted in their efforts by other players, including 
politicians, the Federal Reserve, the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs, such as Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac), some borrowers, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the rating 
agencies. Our goal is to provide an anatomy of the 
crisis, including a brief overview of its implications 
and some discussion of the policy responses to 
what has unfolded. The problems and issues are 
very much in play, and things could readily change 
from the date of this writing (December 10, 2008). 
Three innovations that played some role in 
underpinning the crisis include a novel strategy 
in banking called the originate to distribute model, a 
different form of raising funds called securitization, 
and new entry into a previously untapped area of 
the mortgage market called the subprime segment. 
Although the first two innovations are not recent 
developments, the evolution of and rapid growth in 
subprime lending is quite recent. The combination of 
these business methods and strategies was extremely 
profitable for financial institutions throughout the 
better part of the current decade. But when housing 
prices peaked in late 2006 and started to decline 
fairly rapidly in at least some markets, the inherent 
flaw in the package of strategies became increasingly 
apparent. Large profits turned quickly into 
whopping losses at those institutions with sizeable 
exposures to the subprime segment. But let’s step 
back and look at the scenario in a bit more detail.
The Originate to Distribute Model
As professors of banking have told students 
for many years, commercial banks act as financial 
intermediaries. The defining characteristics of this 
business are deposit taking and lending. But for the 
This article discusses the factors that underpinned and facilitated the financial crisis that 
continues to plague the global economy. We suggest that each of the causal elements can 
be viewed as examples of “innovation gone awry.” We explain how what appeared to be 
a relatively small, fairly localized problem relative to the huge scale of financial markets 
became a much larger problem with severely adverse implications for the global macro 
economy. We also consider how institutional mistakes and failures contributed to the crisis. 
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better part of banking history, when institutions 
made new loans, they held them on their balance 
sheets until they matured. Because banks were 
quite careful in assessing the creditworthiness of 
borrowers, loans were repaid roughly 98 to 99 percent 
of the time, on average. Despite the widespread 
success of this strategy, some bank managers, 
especially those at larger institutions, recognized 
that the capacity to grow loans was limited by the 
rate at which new deposits were arriving. Why not 
try to sell some of the loans already made to other 
financial institutions or investors in the capital 
markets and use the cash from the sales to fund new 
loans? This cycle of generating loans for the purpose 
of sale and then generating still more loans became 
known as the originate to distribute model. Banks 
were, in effect, getting paid fees to assess who was 
creditworthy and who was not, but not for taking the 
risk that the loan would default.1 Buyers of the loans 
assumed the credit risk and received the interest on 
the loans as compensation. Although this situation 
implies that originators might pay less attention 
to the quality of the loans they originate if they no 
longer bear the risk, the prospect that a borrower 
might default would still need to be low enough 
for a loan buyer to find the loan attractive. But if 
loan buyers were less careful in assessing risks than 
originators, the originate to distribute strategy could 
result in higher defaults than the old-fashioned 
strategy of originating and holding the loans. 
Securitization as a Funding Strategy
Securitization is a funding strategy that involves 
creating a bond that is collateralized by a pool of loans. 
Although practically any loan can be securitized, 
mortgages represent by far the most popular type 
of securitization. In 2000–2006, about 75 percent of 
all mortgage loans were securitized, creating assets 
known as mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are major players in the 
securitization market, both as buyers of mortgages 
to form the pools of collateral, as guarantors on the 
securities, and as owners of MBS. The availability 
of the securitization option facilitates the use of the 
originate to distribute strategy, of course. The buyers 
1	 	Banks	that	sold	loans	might	also	make	some	profit	on	the	sale	
itself. Banks were also motivated to sell by regulations that re-
quired that loans be backed with relatively expensive capital. If  
the loan seller did not grant any recourse to the buyer, the loan 
was removed from the balance sheet and the capital requirement 
was avoided. 
of MBS, such as banks, insurance companies, mutual 
funds, pension funds, and wealthy individuals, find 
them attractive because they have higher returns 
than Treasury securities of like maturity, are highly 
liquid, and have been viewed as having relatively 
little default risk, either because of the perceived 
benefits of diversification in the pool of mortgages 
that form the collateral or because of guarantees, 
or both.2 Commercial and investment banks also 
like securitization because they can earn large fees 
for underwriting the MBS and other asset-backed 
bonds. By 2007, about 10 large commercial banks 
were receiving more fee income from securitization 
activities than all 8,500 banks collectively received 
from traditional deposit and lending activities. 
The amount of securitized bonds in the United 
States exceeded $10 trillion by mid-2008. The 
volume of activity grew so rapidly during the last 
3–4 years that many investment banks bought 
companies that specialized in originating mortgages 
to have ready access to the raw material (the 
underlying mortgages) that underpin securitization.
The Birth and Rapid Growth of 
Subprime Lending 
Prime mortgages go to borrowers with good 
credit histories who make sizeable down payments 
and document their incomes. Subprime borrowers 
lack one or more of these characteristics. Subprime 
lending represents an innovation designed to help 
achieve a long-standing, politically supported social 
goal: an increase in homeownership, especially 
among low-income and minority households. 
From essentially zero in 1993, subprime mortgage 
lending grew at a compound annual growth rate 
of 26 percent to $625 billion by 2005, comprising 
close to one fourth of the total mortgage market at 
its peak.3 Subprime lending was itself facilitated by 
another innovation, the application of credit-scoring 
techniques to mortgage originations, which allowed 
underwriting to become automated. Subprime 
2  The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie 
Mae) insures against default on MBS in return for a fee, as do 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
3  If  another category of  mortgages, Alt-A loans, is included with 
subprime, the ratio rises above 30 percent in 2005–07. Alt-A 
borrowers have higher FICO scores than subprime customers, 
but remain non-prime because of  a lack of  documentation 
about income or assets, or a high loan-to-value ratio, or a high 
payment-to-income ratio. 
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borrowers typically have FICO scores below 640.4 
Some firms, such as New Century Financial and 
First Franklin, specialized in subprime lending, but 
the majority of originations were by independent 
mortgage brokers, who have always followed the 
originate to distribute strategy. Some 12 million new 
homeowners were created over the last 8–10 years, 
and home ownership rose from 64 to 69 percent.
To provide the funds necessary to support 
the rapid growth of subprime lending, originators 
turned to securitization. Brokerage firms, banks, 
and even homebuilders issued so-called “private-
label” MBS that often lacked the guarantees 
associated with the securities issued by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. In yet another innovation, 
the MBS themselves became collateral for other 
securities called collateralized debt obligations. 
Over the period 2000–2007, the volume of subprime 
mortgage-backed securities grew by 800 percent. 
One key difference between prime and subprime 
mortgages is that the latter are usually structured 
as hybrids in which the interest rate is fixed for the 
first two or three years, then resets to a variable, 
and typically much higher, rate. This so-called 2/28 
or 3/27 loan structure creates a strong incentive 
for borrowers to refinance at or near the rate reset 
period. About 80 percent of subprime mortgages 
also have prepayment fees (versus only about 2 
percent of prime mortgages), making refinancing 
more profitable in this case. The end result of 
this approach to structuring subprime loans is 
that the payoff profile becomes highly dependent 
on housing prices. As long as housing prices are 
increasing sufficiently, lenders and borrowers win 
from refinancing. But if housing prices decline, 
refinancing is no longer rational, and borrowers 
face a high prospect of defaulting following 
the rate reset. Housing prices began to decline 
nationally in the summer of 2006, and it quickly 
became clear that plenty of losing bets outstanding 
were embedded in both the mortgages and the 
securities that they appeared to be securing. The 
S&P/Case Shiller Index of house prices in 20 large 
U.S. markets nationally has dropped in every 
subsequent quarter since the peak and is down 
almost 21 percent through the third quarter of 2008.5
4  FICO scores were developed by Fair Isaac and Company as 
an inexpensive means of  predicting loan default. FICO scores 
range from 350 to 800. The lower the score, the higher the 
prospect of  default.
5	 	In	contrast,	the	Office	of 	Federal	Housing	Enterprise	estimates	
Why Did a Small Problem Become a 
Large Problem?
Although the subprime market grew rapidly, 
it remained only a very small portion of the U.S. 
credit markets, which were roughly $24.4 trillion at 
year-end 2007. Yet credit became widely unavailable 
during the financial crisis, and various segments 
of the market were widely described in the press 
as “frozen,” “shut down,” or “non-functional.” 
How did a problem in a small segment of the 
market get transmitted to the wider credit market? 
The first signs of the crisis became visible in two 
little-known, but sizeable segments of the market: 
the repurchase agreement (RP) market and the 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market. 
Repurchase agreements are secured loans, 
primarily extended by one financial institution to 
another. The key element of an RP is that if the 
borrower defaults, the lender seizes the collateral 
and sells it to recoup the value of the loan. Various 
types of collateral exist, only a small portion of 
which are subprime-backed securities. Nonetheless, 
this huge market (estimated to be about $7 trillion) 
almost completely dried up in August 2007 and 
remained dormant for several months. Traders were 
unwilling to accept most types of collateral because 
they were unsure they would be able to sell at any 
price close to the loan value in the event of default. 
Without the funding supplied by RPs, the issuers 
were forced to cut back dramatically on their lending. 
Commercial paper is short-term debt (less than 
90 days) that is often unsecured, but it can also be 
backed by financial assets, including subprime loans 
or loans to institutions with exposures in the subprime 
market. Issues of ABCP had increased from about 
$600 billion in 2005 to $1.2 trillion by the fall of 2007. 
Recognizing the emerging problems in the subprime 
market, when such debt matured during the fourth 
quarter of 2007 lenders simply refused to provide 
new financing, and the volume of ABCP dropped 
sharply in just a few months to roughly $800 billion. 
Much of the decline in willingness to lend 
reflected a high degree of uncertainty about the value 
of assets in general, but especially about so-called 
structured assets, only part of which were subprime-
related.6 As 2008 unfolded, it became increasingly 
that U.S. homeowners enjoyed an increase in their house prices 
of  over 54 percent, on average, from 2001 to 2005.
6  A structured asset	is	one	with	a	cash	flow	that	is	derived	from	
some	other	 asset	 or	 is	 contingent	 on	 some	 specified	 event.	
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clear that sizeable losses would be incurred by large 
institutions that were heavily invested in subprime-
related assets. Under accounting regulations, these 
assets are required to be marked to market on the 
balance sheets of the institutions holding them. 
Losses on these assets, which totaled as much as 
30–50 percent of their value, must be subtracted 
from the equity on the companies’ balance sheets. 
Many of the large investment banks active in 
the subprime area were very highly leveraged, 
which means they had relatively little equity to 
support losses. For example, Bear Stearns, which 
was acquired by JP Morgan Chase in March 
2008—preventing an imminent bankruptcy, used 
only about $3 dollars of equity to fund every $100 of 
assets. In other words, Bear Stearns was borrowing 
money, much of it for fairly short periods, to invest 
in assets that represented large bets on housing 
prices. As the lenders saw the prospective losses 
accumulating, they refused to roll over their loans, 
and Bear Stearns was no longer viable. A similar 
fate awaited Lehman Brothers, which was even 
more highly leveraged and declared bankruptcy 
on September 15, 2008. Because virtually no trading 
was being done in the distressed subprime assets, 
these instruments became increasingly difficult to 
value. Consequently, no one had a strong sense of 
the magnitude of the losses financial institutions 
were facing. Banks were increasingly unwilling to 
lend, not just to households and businesses, but 
even to each other. Faced with a drastic decline in 
liquidity and recognizing they were over-leveraged, 
many institutions began to sell assets. But this 
simply drove asset prices down even further, and 
institutions were caught in a debt-deflation cycle. 
To address the lack of liquidity and to attempt 
to restore some confidence that financial failures 
would be limited, the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve created a series of programs (referred to 
more colloquially as “bailouts”) to inject funds 
into the credit markets in the form of loans and 
investments. The Federal Reserve, which formerly 
lent only to depository institutions, is now lending to 
investment banks, insurance companies, issuers of 
commercial paper, and managers of money market 
mutual funds.7 The Fed is no longer a banker’s bank, 
Structured assets contain embedded options.
7	 	As	 a	 result	 of 	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 no	 large,	 free-standing	
investment banks are remaining in the United States. Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt, Bear Stearns was acquired by JP 
Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of  America, 
but is instead acting like a regular bank. And like 
a regular bank, it may suffer losses on some of its 
loans. If that happens, the taxpayers will bear those 
losses. The most publicized of these programs, the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), makes up 
to $700 billion available to financial institutions 
in the form of preferred stock investments.
The total funds that have been made available 
to date through all these governmental efforts have 
been estimated to be $3–4 trillion. More may come. 
These funds have been either borrowed by the 
Treasury or involve monies created by the Federal 
Reserve through its monetary policy authority. These 
amounts do not measure the taxpayers’ financial 
exposure to the bailouts, however, because some 
(small? large?) chance exists that all the loans will 
be repaid and the preferred stock redeemed. If this 
were to happen, the taxpayers would actually profit 
because the interest on the loans and the dividends 
on the stock are higher than the Treasury’s cost of 
borrowing. But reasonable prospects are that at 
least some of the funds will not be repaid. Because 
we cannot readily predict defaults by the recipients 
of government funds, the taxpayers’ exposure is 
unknown and is likely to be uncertain for some time. 
The economy is mired in what appears to be a 
lengthy recession, so more bailouts may be on the 
horizon, and some losses to taxpayers seem almost 
inevitable. It appears very likely that substantial 
government funds will soon be made available to 
forestall what will otherwise be a substantial number 
of foreclosures. Although the size and substance 
of such a program is unknown, it may prove the 
riskiest to the taxpayers. In the limited experience 
we have in the area of loan modifications to forestall 
foreclosures, a relatively high percentage of modified 
loans are back in default within less than a year. 
Taxpayers face still another risk. The Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet has ballooned from about 
$800 billion to roughly $2.5 trillion as of year-end 
2008. Some of the increase in Federal Reserve 
assets is funded by borrowings from the Treasury, 
but a sizeable portion reflects the creation of bank 
reserves, which is contributing to a rapid expansion 
of the U.S. money supply. This increase in the money 
supply is designed to be temporary, and the Fed’s 
and Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have become bank 
holding	companies.	Affiliating	with	a	financial	holding	company	
or becoming a bank holding company improves access to 
financial	support	from	the	Federal	Reserve,	but	also	permits	
the Fed to be more involved in regulating these companies. 
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objective will be to shrink its balance sheet (and 
consequently the money supply) as the financial 
crisis ebbs. If the Fed fails to accomplish this, the 
U.S. economy will transition to a permanently 
higher rate of inflation. Since inflation erodes the 
real value of assets, the outcome would ironically 
be similar to the one that current policies are trying 
to prevent: further declines in asset values and 
the attendant wealth losses. The Federal Reserve 
has announced that it is considering borrowing 
money in the capital markets to avoid using money 
creation to fund its rescue operations. This would 
be yet another unprecedented action on their part.
Could We Have Avoided This Mess? 
We have identified a chain of events, each 
encouraged to some extent by financial innovation, 
which culminated in the financial crisis of 2008. 
But did all this have to happen this way? Who 
might have prevented, or at least mitigated, the 
crisis? Who aided and abetted the crisis? Politicians 
certainly played some role by treating housing 
as a sector of the economy that deserved strong 
governmental support and in providing an implicit 
guarantee on the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.8 These two government-sponsored enterprises 
held or guaranteed over $5 trillion dollars worth of 
outstanding mortgages at the time of their demise. 
The Federal Reserve also laid some of the foundation 
for the crisis by keeping interest rates very low 
(below the rate of inflation) from 2002 through 
much of 2005, facilitating the increased demand 
for housing. Also culpable were borrowers who 
assumed mortgage obligations much beyond their 
8  The implicit debt guarantee became quite explicit when both 
Fannie and Freddie were placed in conservatorship in Septem-
ber. In addition to the guarantees, Fannie and Freddie were 
provided with $200 billion in government funds in the form 
of  preferred stock investment.
abilities to repay and institutions that were willing 
to extend those credits. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission might have made some efforts to 
restrain the very rapid growth in the use of financial 
leverage by investment banks. The rating agencies 
failed to adequately inform investors of the risk 
inherent in the menu of new structured products, 
especially those backed by subprime loans. Finally, 
the boards of directors of the companies that 
contributed to the financial crisis failed to adequately 
perform their governance roles in restraining 
excessive risk taking. In other words, plenty of 
blame for the financial crisis can be spread around. 
The crisis has taught us many costly lessons. 
No doubt significant efforts will be made to 
address some of these failings through new 
regulations, including some likely restructuring 
of our regulatory architecture (that is, who will be 
responsible for regulating what). Efforts to enhance 
the coordination of regulation globally are also 
quite likely. It is too early to speculate what these 
efforts might entail, but given the large scale of the 
crisis, the governmental response will almost surely 
likewise be large. A definite risk exists of regulatory 
overkill and multiple applications of the law of 
unintended consequences. The crisis is far from 
over, and the needed corrections in the financial 
system will be complicated by the weak state of the 
U.S and global economies. Yet the credit markets 
must begin again to perform their vital functions for 
the recovery to get underway. The economy and the 
financial system are definitely sailing in uncharted 
waters, and we remain some distance from the 
shores of financial health and economic well being. 
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The Year the Wheels Fell Off the Economy:
A Review of Economic Performance in 2008 and 
Forecasts for 2009
Kenneth R. Troske
I. Introduction
 Wow.  2008 will certainly be remembered as one 
of the most turbulent years in recent memory.  While 
the economy experienced slow, but fairly persistent, 
growth through the first half of the year, there 
were signs of impending trouble—the continuing 
deterioration of the housing market and rapidly 
rising prices for food and energy.  However, almost 
no one predicted what happened to the economy in 
the last three months.  Confidence in the financial 
sector of the economy seemed to evaporate almost 
overnight leading to a significant drop in the stock 
market and the freezing up of credit markets.  This 
in turn lead to a precipitous decline in consumer 
spending, which has spread the troubles in the 
financial and housing sectors to the rest of the 
economy.  The result has been a decline in output, a 
significant increase in the unemployment rate, and 
falling prices.  In an attempt to reverse the decline 
in the economy, the federal government along with 
the Federal Reserve System instituted the largest 
expansion of the government sector since the Great 
Depression: nationalizing banks and insurance 
companies, purchasing an extensive amount of 
commercial paper, and even taking an ownership 
stake in private auto makers.  Unfortunately, similar 
to what we saw in the Great Depression, there is no 
evidence that any of these actions has had an impact 
on the economy—at least not yet.  Given all of these 
changes, the economy we have in January 2009 is 
certainly a much different economy than the one we 
faced in January 2008.  
 While Kentucky certainly has not escaped the 
turbulence that has rocked the national economy, if 
there is a silver lining, it might be that the Kentucky 
economy appears to be experiencing a much 
smaller slowdown than states such as California, 
New York and Florida.  While unemployment has 
risen in Kentucky, and the troubles in the auto 
industry have had a significant effect on the State’s 
economy, Kentucky appears to have experienced 
much less turbulence in the housing sector, so 
consumers in Kentucky seem to be more confident 
than consumers elsewhere.  Of course any optimism 
about the Kentucky economy must be tempered 
by the recognition that Kentucky remains one of 
the poorest states in the country and our relatively 
better performance during the current recession is 
unlikely to change this fact.  
 So what should we expect from the economy in 
the coming year?  Well, it appears that the problems 
in the housing sector—declining prices, slowing 
housing starts and high rates of foreclosure—will 
persist throughout 2009 and into 2010.  This in 
turn will limit the growth in both the U.S. and 
The year 2008 will certainly be remembered as one of the most turbulent years in recent 
memory with the continuing deterioration of the housing market, the sudden collapse of the 
financial sector, and the subsequent decline in prices and output.  In addition, the federal 
government’s response to these problems has produced one of the largest expansions of 
government into the private sector since the Great Depression.  In this article I review the main 
trends we have seen in the U.S. and Kentucky economies in the past several years, discuss the 
trends we have seen in the parts of the economy that I expect to have a significant impact in the 
coming year—the housing, financial and manufacturing sectors, personal consumption and 
fuel prices—and discuss my predictions for 2009.  My forecast for the U.S. is that the economy 
will contract by 0.5 percent for all of 2009, that unemployment will average 8 percent for the 
year—which would be the highest rate since the 1982-84 recession—and that there will be 
almost no change in prices.  My forecast for Kentucky is that the State’s economy will grow by 
approximately 0.5 percent in 2009 but that the unemployment rate in Kentucky will average 
8.2 percent for the year and will be slightly above the unemployment rate for the nation. 
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Kentucky economies. 
However, I do expect that 
both economies will start 
growing again, although 
not until the latter half of 
2009.  So while I believe 
we will continue to see 
slow or negative growth 
and relatively high rates 
of unemployment in 2009, 
I remain confident that 
when I write this forecast 
next year I will be writing 
about the beginning of 
a recovery instead of 
the continuation of a 
recession.  
 In the rest of this article I will review the main 
trends we have seen in the U.S. and Kentucky 
economies in the past several years.  I will also 
examine some of the trends we have seen in the parts 
of the economy that I expect to have a significant 
impact in the coming year—the housing, financial 
and manufacturing sectors, personal consumption 
and fuel prices.  Finally, I will discuss in more detail 
my predictions for 2009.  
II. Overview of the U.S. and 
Kentucky Economies
A. The Slowing Economy
According to the business cycle dating committee 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
the U.S. entered a recession in December of 2007. 
Figure 1, which plots 
the percentage change 
in the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) by quarter 
for the U.S., shows that 
the economy did indeed 
experience a contraction 
in the fourth quarter of 
2007, of approximately 
-0.2 percent.  However, 
t h e  U . S .  e c o n o m y 
expanded in both the 
first and second quarters 
of 2008, albeit by less than 
2 percent, before again 
contracting in the third 
quarter by -0.5 percent.  Forecasts for the fourth 
quarter are for an even larger contraction, with 
some economists forecasting a contraction of the 
U.S. economy of 4 to 6 percent, which would be the 
largest quarterly decline in the economy since 1982. 
Clearly the U.S. economy is struggling.  
 The data presented in Figure 2 shows the annual 
growth in GDP for both the U.S. and Kentucky. 
This figure makes clear that in the last several 
years the U.S. economy has grown faster than the 
Kentucky economy, but that the U.S. economy 
may now be growing at a slightly slower rate than 
the Kentucky economy.  In 2007 the Kentucky 
economy outperformed the U.S. economy and all 
indications are that this will continue to be true in 
2008.  Figure 3, which presents the annual growth 
in GDP for the largest metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSA) in Kentucky, shows that there have 
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Figure 1: Percentage Change in U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure 2: Percentage Change in GDP in the U.S. and Kentucky
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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been some significant differences 
in economic performance across 
different areas in Kentucky.  Since 
2004 the Lexington-Fayette MSA 
has been the fastest growing of 
the three areas, followed by the 
Louisville-Jefferson MSA, with 
the Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky 
MSA experiencing the slowest 
growth.  
B. The Deterioration of the Labor 
Market
 Further evidence that the 
U.S. economy entered a recession 
in the fourth quarter of 2007 is 
provided by Figure 4, which 
shows the unemployment rates 
for the U.S. and Kentucky.  Between 
January 2004 and January 2007 the 
unemployment rate in Kentucky 
was higher than the unemployment 
rate for the entire U.S.  Since then, 
however, the unemployment rates 
in Kentucky and the U.S. have been 
similar.  Throughout 2008 the U.S. 
and Kentucky unemployment 
rates have been rising fairly 
consistently.  In December 2008 the 
unemployment rate in the U.S. was 
7.2 percent, which is a 44 percent 
increase over the rate twelve 
months earlier.  In Kentucky in 
December 2008 the unemployment 
rate stood at 7.0 percent, which 
is 32 percent higher than a year 
earlier.  
 Further evidence of the 
deteriorating labor market is 
provided in Figure 5, which shows 
the growth in employment in the 
U.S and Kentucky.  In this figure 
employment in a period is measured 
relative to employment in January 
2003.  In other words, I have 
divided the actual employment 
in a month by the employment in 
January 2003, and then multiplied 
this ratio by 100.  If the resulting 
number is bigger than 100, this 
means that employment in a given 
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Figure 3: Percentage Change in GDP in Kentucky’s Major 
Metropolitian Statistical Areas (MSAs)
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Figure 4: Unemployment Rate for the U.S. and Kentucky
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 5: Employment Growth in the U.S. and Kentucky
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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month is higher than employment in January 2003; 
and if the number is less than 100 then employment 
is lower.  The actual value shows the percentage 
change in employment since January 2003.  This 
figure shows that employment in the U.S. has been 
declining since December 2007, while employment 
in Kentucky has been declining since March 2008. 
This figure also shows that between January 2004 
and December 2007 growth in employment in the 
U.S. exceeded employment growth in Kentucky, 
but since then the fall in employment in the U.S. 
has been greater than the fall in employment in 
Kentucky.  
 Figures 6 shows that there are some obvious 
differences in labor markets across metropolitan 
areas in Kentucky.  While all three metropolitan 
areas have seen increases in unemployment rates 
over the past year, the Lexington-Fayette MSA 
continues to enjoy unemployment rates that 
are much lower than the 
rates for the state as a 
whole and lower than the 
rates for the Louisville 
and Cincinnati-Northern 
Kentucky MSAs
 C.  A Bright Spot: Prices
 T h e  r e c e n t  f a l l 
in prices is one of the 
few bright spots in the 
economy.  As is shown in 
Figure 7, both the overall 
Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) as well as the core 
CPI have declined fairly 
significantly in recent 
months (the core CPI 
excludes food and energy 
prices).  As I will show in 
the next section, much of 
the decline in the overall 
CPI is the result of a 
decline in energy prices. 
However, the fact that the 
core CPI has also fallen 
shows that the prices of 
other goods and services 
have fallen as well.  It is 
these falling prices that 
lead some economists to 
predict that consumer 
spending will rebound, 
which would indicate the beginning of a recovery. 
III. A Closer Look at the Economy
In this section I will to take a closer look at some 
of the parts of the economy that have contributed 
to the current downturn, and are expected to 
determine when the recovery begins.  These parts 
of the economy include the housing, manufacturing 
and financial sectors, personal consumption 
expenditures and energy prices.  I will start by 
looking at the financial sector.  
A.  A Loss of Confidence in the Financial Sector
 Clearly the recent loss of confidence in the financial 
sector has contributed to the size of the economic 
downturn.  The extent of this loss in confidence can be 
seen in Figure 8, which plots the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average since January 2004.  This figure shows 
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Figure 6: Unemployment Rate for Kentucky’s Major MSAs
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 7: Monthly Change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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that the Dow rose fairly steadily between January 
2004 and October 2007, when it reached its peak at 
around 14,100 points.  Then between October 2007 
and September 2008 the Dow experienced a fairly 
steady decline in value to around 11,500 points. 
However, between the beginning of September and 
the beginning of December the Dow plummeted—
dropping nearly 3000 points or 26 percent of its 
value.  This loss of confidence quickly spread to 
other sectors of the economy.    
B. The Continuing Slide in the Housing Market 
 With the rising foreclosure rates, falling 
prices and the slowdown in new construction the 
housing sector has received close scrutiny since the 
end of 2006.  However, 
in 2008 the problems 
that have plagued the 
housing sector have 
finally spread to the 
rest of the economy.  
 We start by looking 
at  Figure  9  which 
shows the percent of 
all mortgages that are 
in foreclosure for both 
the U.S. and Kentucky. 
Looking first at the line 
for the U.S. we can see 
that the foreclosure rate 
has been rising since 
the beginning of 2006, 
but accelerated quite 
dramatically starting 
in early 2007.  It appears as if the growth in the 
foreclosure rate may have slowed in the last few 
quarters, although we will need more quarters of 
data before we can say with any confidence that the 
growth in foreclosures has slowed or stopped.  
 Comparing the foreclosure rate for Kentucky 
with the rate for the entire country shows that the 
foreclosure rate in Kentucky has been higher than 
the rate for the entire U.S. for most of the period in 
this chart.  However, while the foreclosure rate in 
Kentucky has risen in recent years, the increase in 
Kentucky has been smaller than the increase in the 
rest of the country, and there has been relatively 
little change in the 
foreclosure rate in 
Kentucky in the first 
three quarters of 
2008.  In fact, the 
foreclosure rate 
in the U.S. is now 
almost 20 percent 
higher than the 
foreclosure rate in 
Kentucky.  
 A s  h a s  b e e n 
e x t e n s i v e l y 
d i s c u s s e d ,  o n e 
o f  t h e  p r i m a r y 
reasons  for  the 
rising foreclosure 
rate has been falling 
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Figure 8: Weekly Average of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
Source: Dow Jones Indexes
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Figure 9: Foreclosures as a Percentage of All Mortgages
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
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housing prices.  In Figure 10 I plot the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, or OFHEO, 
housing price index for both the U.S. and Kentucky. 
Looking at the line for the U.S. shows that housing 
prices reached a peak in the second quarter of 2007 
and have been falling since then.  In contrast, the 
price index for Kentucky shows that housing prices 
in this state, while they have fallen somewhat, have 
not declined as much as they have in other parts of 
the country.  
 Further evidence of the relative stability of 
housing prices in Kentucky is found in Figure 11 
which presents the OFHEO housing price index for 
the Lexington, Louisville and Cincinnati-Northern 
Kentucky MSAs.  This figure again shows that, 
while prices have fallen in both Louisville and 
Northern Kentucky, the declines have been small. 
This relatively small decline in housing prices in all 
of Kentucky and in Kentucky’s main metropolitan 
areas is consistent with 
the lower foreclosure rate 
in the state.  
 O n e  o b v i o u s 
question to ask is: “When 
will it all end?”  That 
is, when will housing 
prices stop falling and 
start rising again?  I 
address this question in 
Figure 12 which shows 
the number of new houses 
built and the number of 
new households formed 
each year since 1990 in 
the U.S. Over the long run 
the number of new houses 
built will equal the number of new households 
formed.  While the line showing the number of new 
households jumps around a bit, it does tend to track 
the number of new houses built fairly closely until 
2003.  Then there are several years when the number 
of new houses built exceeds the number of new 
households formed.  Essentially, this means that 
builders were building more houses than there were 
people to buy those houses.  When there is more 
of a good then there are people to buy the good, 
prices will fall.  Since houses are a durable asset it 
will take several years where the number of new 
households formed exceeds the number of houses 
built before this market will stabilize and prices will 
begin to rise again.  As can be seen in the figure, the 
number of new households exceeded the number of 
new houses in 2007, and preliminary data suggests 
the same thing will be true in 2008.  However, 
given the number of new 
houses being built each 
year, it is likely that we 
will continue to have an 
“excess” stock of housing 
and fal l ing housing 
prices until 2010.  This 
downward pressure on 
housing prices will limit 
the size of any economic 
recovery until then.  
 T h i s  a n a l y s i s 
should also make clear 
the problem with efforts 
designed to prop up 
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Figure 10: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) 
Housing Price Index for the U.S. and Kentucky
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housing prices or 
to try and subsidize 
mortgages rates.  Any 
effort to artificially 
increase housing 
p r i c e s  w i l l  j u s t 
encourage builders 
to build more houses, 
which will exacerbate 
the existing excess 
supply and postpone 
a n y  r e c o v e r y . 
Unfortunately, the 
only way out of the 
current  hous ing 
crisis is to wait until 
we have enough new 
households willing to buy the houses that have 
already been built. 
C. Personal Consumption: Spreading Problems to the 
Rest of the Economy
 Much of the growth in the economy in the last 
several years was fueled by the continual growth 
in consumer expenditures.  However, as the old 
adage states, what goes around comes around, so 
it should not be surprising that much of the recent 
downturn has also been fueled by a significant 
decline in consumer spending.  For most people 
their investments in both the stock market and 
the housing market represent their main source 
of wealth: so it was only a matter of time before 
declines in these sectors would have an impact on 
consumer spending. 
T h i s  i s  w h a t  i s 
illustrated in Figure 
13, which shows the 
growth in personal 
c o n s u m p t i o n 
e x p e n d i t u r e  b y 
quarter in the U.S.  As 
is seen in this figure, 
the growth in personal 
consumption began 
to slow in the second 
quarter of 2007 and 
remained anemic 
through the first half 
of 2008.  However, 
in the third quarter 
of  2008 personal 
consumption expenditure actually declined by 
3.8 percent, which is the first decline in consumer 
expenditure since 1991.  This decline in expenditures 
transferred the problems in the financial and 
housing sectors of the economy to other parts of 
the economy, such as the auto industry and retail 
trade.  
D. The Manufacturing Sector: An Important 
Determinant of the Kentucky Economy
 While the manufacturing sector has declined 
in importance in recent years, it still remains a 
significant industry in terms of both output and 
employment, particularly in Kentucky.  The 
manufacturing sector accounts for over less than 
10 percent of employment in the entire U.S. but 
accounts for 13 percent of employment and almost 
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20 percent of earnings 
in Kentucky.  Therefore, 
the  per formance  o f 
this one sector is an 
important determinant 
of the performance of the 
economy—particularly 
in Kentucky.  To assess 
the performance of the 
manufacturing sector, 
Figure 14 plots growth 
i n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
employment for the U.S. 
and Kentucky.  This 
figure is constructed 
in a similar manner as 
Figure 5—employment in 
each period is measured 
relative to employment in 
January 2003.  Numbers 
greater than 100 indicate 
that employment has 
grown since January 
2003, while number less 
than 100 indicates that 
employment in the sector 
has fallen since January 
2003.  
F i g u r e  1 4  s h o w s 
tha t  manufac tur ing 
employment has declined 
since 2003 for both the 
U.S. as a whole and in 
Kentucky.  For the entire 
country manufacturing 
employment fell fairly 
rapidly between January 
2003 and January 2004, 
was  s tab le  through 
the middle  of  2006, 
but began to fall fairly 
quickly over the last two 
years.  In contrast, in 
Kentucky manufacturing 
employment remained 
s teady  through  the 
middle of 2006, but since 
then has been declining 
at a much faster rate than 
for the U.S. as a whole. 
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Figure 14: Growth in Manufacturing Employment in the U.S. and Kentucky
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Figure 16: Average Price of a Gallon of Gasoline in the U.S. and Kentucky
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This decline in manufacturing was particularly 
large in the second half of 2008 when manufacturing 
employment fell by 5 percent.  By the end of 2008 
manufacturing employment in both the U.S. and 
Kentucky was over 10 percent lower than it was in 
January 2003.  Given the greater importance of the 
manufacturing sector in the Kentucky economy, 
this recent drop in manufacturing employment in 
Kentucky is an area of concern.  
E.  Some Hope for the Future: Falling Energy Prices
After being a source of significant concerns for the 
last several years, in the last six months changes in 
all prices in general, and energy prices in particular, 
represent one of the few bright spots in the current 
economy.  Figure 15 shows the price of a barrel of 
oil since 2003.  As this figure shows, after rising for 
five and a half years, the price of a barrel of oil has 
fallen by 70 percent in the last six months and has 
returned to a level last seen in mid 2004.  Figure 16 
shows that this fall in the price of oil produced 
a similar decline in the price of gasoline in both 
the U.S. and Kentucky.  The hope is that falling 
fuel prices will lead to an increase in consumer 
confidence, which would in turn lead to growth 
in consumption expenditures and to growth in the 
overall economy.  
IV.  Outlook for 2009 
 So what will 2009 bring?  In Table 1 I present my 
forecast for the coming year.  In column 1 I present 
my forecast for 2008, in column 2 I show the actual 
performance in 2008, and in column 3 I present my 
prediction for 2009.  
 While I do believe that the economy will begin 
to grow again in 2009, my prediction is that the 
economy will continue to contract in the first half 
of the year and that the continuing problems in 
the housing sector will limit any growth that does 
occur.  Therefore, my forecast is that the economy 
will contract by 0.5 percent for all of 2009, that 
unemployment will average 8 percent for the 
year—which would be the highest rate since the 
1982-84 recession—and that there will be almost no 
change in prices.  
 I am relatively more optimistic about the 
performance of the Kentucky economy in the 
coming year in the state.  While I believe that 
manufacturing employment will continue to decline 
in the coming year, I feel that the relative strength 
of the housing market in Kentucky will mean that 
the Kentucky economy will grow by approximately 
0.5 percent in 2009.  However, I do expect that the 
unemployment rate in Kentucky will grow to 8.2 
percent for the year and will be slightly above the 
unemployment rate for the nation.  
 Of course any optimism about the performance 
of the Kentucky economy should be tempered by 
the recognition that Kentucky remains one of the 
poorest states in the country and that this dubious 
distinction is unlikely to change in the near future. 
Kentucky’s main problem is that Kentucky’s 
workforce remains one of the least educated 
workforces in the country.  It is this structural 
problem that policy makers should focus on fixing 
if they hope to raise the standard of living in the 
state.  Unfortunately, given the budgetary problem 
facing the state, it is unlikely that any solution to 
this problem will be developed in the near future.  
Table 1: Forecast for 2009
 2008 Forecast Actual Performance 
2008
2009 Forecast
Real GDP Growth--U.S. 2.3% 1.2% 0.5%
Unemployment Rate--U.S. 4.7% 5.7% 8.0%
Inflation--U.S. 2.7% 2.5% 0.6%
Employment Growth--U.S. -1.4% -1.0%
Employment Growth--Kentucky -1.2% -0.5%
Growth in Manufacturing 
Employment--U.S.
-4.3% -4.5%
Growth in Manufacturing 
Employment--Kentucky
-4.5% -4.0%
Real GDP Growth--Kentucky 2.4% --- 1.0%
Unemployment Rate--Kentucky 5.7% 6.3% 8.5%
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Efficient allocation of public funds depends on good information about citizens’ 
values of public programs.  The present paper reports on an effort to elicit citizens’ 
preferences over public spending categories in Kentucky.  The data come from a 
representative sample of Kentucky residents surveyed in the summer of 2007.  Estimates 
show that individuals place highest value on education, followed by health care.
Citizens’ Budget Choices for the State of 
Kentucky
Brandon C. Koford
Introduction
The role of citizens in public budgeting 
decisions is of interest in a form of representative 
government.  While citizen participation may have 
to fight a culture of public budgeting in which 
elected officials and administrators work to establish 
budget priorities, the general consensus is that the 
public should be involved in the budget process. 
One example of an elected official seeking citizen 
input in budget decisions in Kentucky includes 
then Governor Ernie Fletcher’s 2006-2007 town 
hall meeting tour to discuss the desires of the 
citizenry on how to best use state budget dollars. 
Former Governor Fletcher used one of the 
many methods for involving citizens in the budget 
budgeting process.  Others include focus groups, 
issue advisory boards, open house informational 
discussions, traditional public meetings, and survey 
research.  Additionally, Donahue et al. (2008) note 
the increasing use of surveys by local government 
to assess the level of citizen satisfaction with 
governments services.  The primary problems with 
these traditional methods of citizen involvement are 
that many fail to obtain a representative sample, 
and almost all fail to include a budget constraint. 
Including a budget constraint when obtaining 
citizens’ input over budgetary decisions has at least 
two advantages.  First, citizens faced with a budget 
constraint must trade off support for some programs 
with lack of support for others.  In other words, 
the budget constraint imposes the condition that 
citizens cannot have more of everything.  Second, 
the budget constraint adds a degree of realism 
for citizens participating in the budget process.
The purpose of the current work is to describe 
the results of an effort to involve citizens of 
Kentucky in the budget process through a widely 
distributed survey.  The method uses state of the art 
techniques for survey research and also incorporates 
a budget constraint into citizens’ decision making. 
The technique involves surveying a representative 
sample of Kentucky as well as asking respondents 
to allocate a $100 million expansion to a public 
budget among the categories contained in the 
budget.  The dollar amount of the expansion is 
clearly indicated, and thus respondents are asked 
to make decisions while facing the public budget 
constraint.  Asking citizens to make choices across 
budget categories in this fashion provides a measure 
of citizens’ preferences for state spending categories.
The technique has several advantages for 
eliciting citizens’ preferences.  First, the method 
requires respondents to make decisions in the 
context of a budget constraint.  This method 
adds realism to the survey design and results in 
more credible responses.  Second, the technique 
provides survey respondents with relevant 
information for making decisions over public 
budget categories.  Specifically, respondents are 
given a description of the programs funded by each 
budget category and the fixed budget expansion 
to be allocated across the categories.  Finally, the 
technique handles concerns about representative 
participation through random sampling methods.
Survey
Elicitation of citizens’ preferences over spending 
categories takes place within the context of a survey 
distributed across the state of Kentucky.  After 
a brief introduction, respondents are provided 
with a scenario in which they are prompted to 
allocate a surplus $100 million in the Kentucky 
Overall State Budget among the categories 
within the budget.  Specifically the survey read:
Please consider the budget categories below.  If you were 
making the choices for the state of Kentucky and an extra $100 
million were available to be added to the existing budgets, 
Center for Business and Economic Research 18
Citizens’ Budget Choices for the State of Kentucky
Figure 1. Example of Allocation Exercise for Overall State Budget
 CHOICES FOR KENTUCKY’S OVERALL STATE BUDGET 
 
Please consider the budget categories below.  If you were making the choices for the state 
of Kentucky and an extra $100 million were available to be added to the existing budgets, 
how much of the $100 million would you put in each of the following budget categories?  
If you put more money into a given area, the programs in that area would be expanded.  If 
no money is allocated to a given area, programs would be maintained at current levels.  
The total should add up to 100. 
 
1  $______ AGRICULTURE:  Animal health, livestock services, and pest management 
2  $______ CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS:  State libraries, arts and humanities, 
museums, and historical societies. 
3  $______ 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:  Industrial development, marketing 
information, community and regional planning, housing and building 
construction. 
4  $______ 
ENVIRONMENT:  Air and water pollution prevention, waste 
management, mining and minerals, forestry, conservation, and energy 
efficiency. 
5  $______ 
FINANCE AND REVENUE:  Investment and debt management, 
computer information systems, property valuation, taxation and 
collection. 
6  $______ HEALTH CARE:  Medicare, Medicaid, county health departments, 
mental health services, and services for the disabled. 
7  $______ HUMAN RESOURCES:  Social services, food stamps, and aid to 
families with dependent children. 
8  $______ JUSTICE:  Jails and correctional systems, state police, and the courts. 
9  $______ 
LABOR AND WORKER’S COMPENSATION:  Occupational safety 
and health payments to workers suffering  job-related injuries and 
diseases 
10  $______ NATIONAL GUARD:  Military affairs, veterans affairs, and disaster relief. 
11  $______ 
SCHOOLS:  Public elementary, middle, and high school construction 
and maintenance, teacher salaries and retirement system, and Kentucky 
Educational Television. 
12  $______ TOURISM:  State parks, fish and wildlife programs, and the state fair. 
13  $______ TRANSPORTATION:  Highway construction and maintenance, 
airports, and public transportation. 
14  $______ UNIVERSITIES:  State university and community college construction 
and maintenance, faculty/staff salaries, research, and student loans. 
     PLEASE MAKE SURE THE TOTAL ADDS UP TO $100 
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 Figure 2. Example of Allocation Exercise for Overall Public Education Budget 
  
CHOICES FOR KENTUCKY’S OVERALL PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL BUDGET 
 
Budget choices are made all the time within state agencies.  If you were making the 
choices for the education budget for the state of Kentucky and an extra $100 million were 
available to be added to the budget categories shown below, how much of the $100 
million would you put in each category?  If you put more money into a given category, 
the programs in that category would be expanded.  If no money is allocated to a given 
category, programs would be maintained at current levels.  The total should add up to 
100. 
 
1  $______ 
LOCAL K-12 PUBLIC SCHOOLS:  Expenditures in this category are used 
to fund teaching and learning programs, tutoring services, nutrition and health 
services, student assessment programs, construction of new buildings, and 
purchases of new technology for local K-12 public schools. 
2  $______ 
STATE 4-YEAR COLLEGES:  Expenditures in this category are used to 
fund instruction, research, public service, academic support, 
scholarships/fellowships, construction of new buildings, and purchases of 
new technology at the state 4-year colleges such as the University of 
Kentucky, the University of Louisville, and the regional state universities. 
3  $______ 
KENTUCKY COMMUNITY AND TECHNICAL COLLEGE 
SYSTEM:  Expenditures in this category are used to fund instruction, public 
service, academic support, scholarships/fellowships, construction of new 
buildings, and purchases of new technology for the Kentucky Community 
and Technical College System. 
4  $______ 
VOCATIONAL AND WORK FORCE TRAINING PROGRAMS:  
Expenditures in this category are used to fund education and technical 
training to new and existing workers to match the needs of Kentucky 
businesses and industry. 
    PLEASE MAKE SURE THE TOTAL ADDS UP TO $100 
 
 
how much of the $100 million would you put in each of the 
following budget categories?  If you put more money into 
a given area, the programs in that area would be expanded.  
If no money is allocated to a given area, programs would be 
maintained at current levels.  The total should add up to 100.
For an example of the entire allocation exercise, 
see Figure 1.  Budget categories were selected to 
represent general budget areas in the Kentucky State 
Executive Budget.  Each category is accompanied by 
a description of the services funded by the category. 
Respondents are told that allocating money to a given 
budget would allow the programs in that category 
to expand beyond current levels.  If the respondent 
allocated no money to a given budget category, they 
were told that the programs in that category would 
be maintained at current levels.  A similar allocation 
exercise is replicated for the Public Education Budget 
(see Figure 2).  Because the respondent is given an 
extra $100 million in public funds, each allocation is 
made in the context of this explicit budget constraint.
The survey was distributed June and July 
of 2007 by the survey research firm Knowledge 
Networks.  The sample was drawn based on random 
digit dialing techniques and random white pages 
sampling in the state of Kentucky.  A total of 10,370 
households were invited to complete the survey.  Of 
those surveys mailed, 804 were undeliverable.  A 
total of 2,956 surveys were returned for a response 
rate of 31 percent (2,956 / 9,566).  The estimation 
sample used for data analysis in this context was 
further adjusted for individuals under the age of 18 
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Table 1. Demographics of KCTCS Survey vs. American Community Survey 2005 for Kentucky† 
KCTCS Survey 
American 
Community 
Survey 2005
Gender Female 54.42% 51.87%
Age 18-29 23.34% 20.93%
30-39 16.70% 18.38%
40-49 21.08% 20.51%
50-64 26.41% 24.12%
65 or over 12.47% 16.04%
Race White 89.82% 90.97%
Education Less than High School Diploma 13.13% 20.65%
High School Diploma or Equivalent 32.94% 34.93%
Some College 21.39% 20.30%
Associate Degree 9.22% 6.30%
Bachelor's Degree 13.60% 11.06%
Master's Degree or Beyond 9.72% 6.76%
Household Income Under $25,000 34.00% 35.02%
$25,000 - $39,999 19.45% 18.11%
$40,000 - $59,999 20.07% 18.72%
$60,000 - $99999 17.63% 18.29%
$100,000 or more 8.84% 9.86%
†Both the KCTCS Survey statistics and the American Community Survey statistics are for those 
individuals 18 years old or over. KCTCS Survey statistics are based on the estimation sample  n = 
1706.
Table 2. Allocations for  Kentucky's Overall State Budget ($100 Million Increment)
Budget Category Mean Standard Deviation
Schools $16.2 12.3
Health Care $14.3 10.9
Universities $10.1 8.4
Environment $8.0 6.9
Economic Development $7.0 7.8
Transportation $6.8 6.4
National Guard $6.2 6.3
Agriculture $5.6 6.4
Human Resources $5.5 6.2
Cultural Institutions $4.6 5.2
Justice $4.6 4.9
Labor and Worker's Compensation $4.4 5.1
Tourism $3.9 4.3
Finance and Revenue $2.9 4.2
Allocations that are significantly different at the 5 percent level are set apart by a shaded row.  
Allocations that are above (below) the double lines are greater (less) than the proportional allocation of 
$7.1 million.  n = 1706.
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and for surveys with incomplete or missing 
data.  The final estimation sample contained 
1,706 usable observations.  Table 1 compares 
demographic information for the estimation 
sample to Kentucky as a whole using data from 
the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 
2005.  The table shows that the gender, age, race, 
education, and income demographics of the survey 
sample are representative of the state as a whole.
Dillman (2007) notes two important items that put 
the survey’s response rate in context.  First, general 
populations surveys, such as the one discussed 
here, typically have lower response rates than 
surveys administered to specific subpopulations—
attendees to a particular school or employees of 
a specific firm, for example.  Second, response 
rates typically decline with survey length and 
complexity.  The survey described herein contained 
14 pages, 28 questions, with several questions 
requiring respondents to allocate dollars over as 
Table 3. Allocations for Kentucky's Public Education Budget ($100 Million Increment) 
Budget Category Mean Standard Deviation
Local K-12 Public Schools $33.8 14.7
State 4-Year Colleges $22.6 9.8
KCTCS $22.4 8.1
Vocational and Work Force Training Programs $21.2 9.8
Allocations that are significantly different are set apart by a shaded row.  Allocations that are above (below) 
the double lines are greater (less) than the proportional allocation of $25 million.  n = 1706. 
Table 4. Comparison Between Actual Budget Totals and Survey Respondents' Allocations:  Overall State Budget
2007 Percent 2007 Ranking Budget Survey Survey Ranking
Health Care 28.21% 1 14.30% 2
Schools 24.17% 2 16.20% 1
Universities 21.45% 3 10.00% 3
Transportation 10.52% 4 6.80% 6
Human Resources 4.61% 5 5.50% 9
Justice 3.91% 6 4.60% 10
Finance and Revenue 2.98% 7 2.90% 14
Labor and Worker's 
Compensation 1.10% 8 4.40% 12
Cultural Institutions 0.99% 9 4.60% 11
Environment 0.98% 10 8.00% 4
National Guard 0.56% 11 6.20% 7
Agriculture 0.33% 12 5.60% 8
Economic Development 0.13% 13 7.00% 5
Tourism 0.07% 14 3.90% 13
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Table 6. Comparisons Between Allocations for  Kentucky's Overall State Budget: 2007 & 1995
Budget Category 2007 Mean 2007 Rank 1995 Mean 1995 Rank
Education† $26.3 1 18.0 1
Health Care $14.3 2 12.1 2
Environment $8.0 3 8.7 3
Economic Development $7.0 4 7.5 6
Transportation $6.8 5 8.6 4
National Guard $6.2 6 4.4 11
Agriculture $5.6 7 5.6 8
Human Resources $5.5 8 5.7 7
Cultural Institutions $4.6 9 4.0 12
Justice $4.6 10 8.2 5
Labor and Worker's Compensation $4.4 11 5.2 9
Tourism $3.9 12 5.1 10
Finance and Revenue $2.9 13 3.4 13
†To be comparable with the 1995 survey, the 2007 survey's Schools and Universities categories were combined 
into the single Education category.
Table 5. Comparison Between Actual Budget Totals and Survey Respondents' Allocations:  Public Education Budget
2007 Percent 2007 Ranking Budget Survey Survey Ranking
Local K-12 Public Schools 50.95% 1 33.80% 1
State 4-Year Colleges 41.31% 2 22.60% 2
Kentucky Community and 
Technical College System
5.71% 3 22.40% 3
Vocational and Work Force 
Training Programs 2.03% 4 21.20% 4
many as 14 categories.  Seen in the context of the 
survey’s length and complexity, the response rate 
is high.  In addition, similar demographics between 
respondents and the state as a whole provide 
reassuring evidence that the sample is representative.
Results
The budget allocations were used to obtain 
respondents’ relative valuations on programs that 
make up the budget.  Respondents’ allocations 
for the Overall State Budget Categories are 
presented in Table 2.  The table shows citizens’ 
strong preference for education in the state.  The 
“Schools” category received the largest portion of 
the surplus funds with an average of $16 million. 
The average respondent also cares a great deal 
about health care as evidenced by their allocation 
of a substantial portion of the additional funds for 
the “Health Care” category, which is comprised 
of state financed health care such as Medicaid 
and mental health services.  The “Universities” 
category received the third highest allocation with 
a $10 million average allocation.  Education and 
health care are the two biggest priorities for the 
typical respondent.  All other budget categories 
would receive substantially less money than 
these programs, with the “Finance and Revenue” 
category receiving the fewest dollars at $3 million.
Next, Kentucky citizens’ views on education 
spending are explored in more detail.  Specifically, 
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the mean allocation for each category of the Public 
Education Budget is presented in Table 3.  The 
“Local K-12 Public School” category receives 
the most out of any category with an average 
allocation of $34 million.  The K-12 schools likely 
received the largest increase in resources because 
most citizens in Kentucky have had some personal 
interaction with K-12 schools, whereas a much 
smaller percentage have attended a public post 
secondary school.  According to the American 
Community Survey 2005, 79 percent of people 25 
years and over had at least graduated from high 
school while only 19 percent had a bachelor’s 
degree or higher.  The remaining three categories – 
“Vocational and Work Force Training Programs,” 
“Kentucky Community and Technical College 
System” (KCTCS), and “State Four-year Colleges” 
would receive approximately the same allocation in 
funding of roughly $22 million per program.  This 
result implies citizens prefer that vocational / work 
force training programs, KCTCS and the state’s four-
year colleges grow at approximately the same rate.
It is interesting to compare respondents’ 
allocations with the allocations of the actual 
budget.  Tables 4 and 5 compare actual budget 
figures for the 2007 Kentucky State Budget to 
respondents’ allocations for the additional $100 
million.  Interestingly in Table 4, the top three 
spending categories in the 2007 actual Overall State 
Budget are also the categories receiving the three 
highest allocations from respondents.  Similarly, the 
“Tourism” category ranks low in the actual budget 
and in respondents’ allocations.  Table 5 shows 
the similarity between the actual budget ranking 
and respondent ranking for the Public Education 
Budget.  The rankings match perfectly even though 
magnitudes vary substantially.  In general, it 
appears that respondents’ rank orderings are similar 
to the rank order of the actual budget.  The primary 
difference between the two is that respondents tend 
to allocate more evenly than the state government.
In order to obtain a sense of respondents’ 
preferences over time, a comparison between the 
current survey results and results obtained from the 
University of Kentucky’s Center for Business and 
Economic Research in 1995 (Blomquist et al. 2004) 
is also performed.  The results are striking.  Table 
6 shows that after 12 years, the top three categories 
receiving the most dollars allocated remain the 
same.  In addition, of the top five allocations in 2007, 
four are in the top five in 1995.  Furthermore, the fifth 
category, “Economic Development,” was ranked 
sixth in 1995. Kentuckians place an emphasis on 
education, health care and environmental programs, 
and this preference appears to be stable over time. 
Conclusion
The work here has presented a method for 
eliciting citizens’ preferences over state spending 
categories.  One limitation of the work in the 
context of the current economic climate is that 
the survey focuses on an expansion in spending 
areas.  Indeed, when the survey was written, an 
expansion seemed to be appropriate considering 
Kentucky’s budget surpluses in fiscal years 2005 
and 2006.  The state legislatures of the 2008-2010 
budgetary session faced a very different concern, 
however.  Instead of surplus funds, legislatures 
were faced with the task of how to trim budgets in 
order to adjust the state’s budget shortfall.  Many 
strategies were discussed and few public programs 
were spared cuts in funding.  Understanding the 
preferences of citizens when faced with decisions 
to cut programs would result in a public more 
satisfied, or less dissatisfied, with public programs. 
Although the present work did not ask 
respondents about a budget shortfall, clearly lessons 
can be learned from the preferences elicited from 
citizens in the survey.  There appears to be a strong 
preference for allocating dollars to educational 
programs.  This preference appears in both 1995 and 
2007.  Similarly, respondents allocate fewest dollars 
to the “Finance and Revenue” category in both years. 
One possible way of using the elicited preference 
information would be to assume that citizens 
would prefer the largest budget cuts to occur in 
categories to which they allocated the fewest dollars 
.  If that assumption holds true, then citizens’ 
preferences would indicate that a budget shortfall 
be address by cutting the most funds from the 
“Finance and Revenue category”.  The category 
to receive the fewest budget cuts would be 
the “Schools” category.  Ultimately if budget 
actions in response to a budget shortfall are to be 
consistent with the preferences of the citizenry, a 
survey questioning citizens on their preferences 
regarding budget cuts would be appropriate. 
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Kentucky’s Urban/Rural Landscape: 
What is driving the differences in wealth across Kentucky?
Alison F. Davis
I. Introduction
While some of Kentucky’s neighboring states 
have improved their status in per capita income, 
Kentucky has remained stagnant.  Kentucky, with a 
per capita income of $31,111, is currently ranked 46th 
in the nation with only South Carolina, Arkansas, 
West Virginia, and Mississippi faring worse.1 
However, there are vast differences across the rural 
and urban areas of Kentucky that are driving this 
result.  The urban areas of Kentucky have witnessed 
significant growth; in some instances outpacing the 
growth of many of the urban areas in Kentucky’s 
bordering states.  Sanford and Troske (2007) found 
that the lack of progress in Kentucky is largely 
determined by the low level of growth in the rural 
areas of Kentucky, particularly in 
Eastern Kentucky.  Policy that is 
created to address the economic 
issues of Kentucky, treating 
the state as a whole, will likely 
be unsuccessful because of the 
large degree of heterogeneity 
in its people, industry, and 
landscape.  This paper examines 
the differences between urban 
and rural Kentucky and estimates 
the impact of demographic, 
economic, and quality of life 
variables on per capita income at the county level. 
Kentucky is composed of 120 counties where 
thirty-five counties are classified as urban and 
the remaining 85 counties are rural based on 
the Department of Agriculture’s Urban-Rural 
continuum codes (sometimes called Beale codes) 
produced by their Economic Research Service 
(ERS). These codes from 1 (most urban) to 9 (most 
rural) allow counties to be ranked on their degree 
of rurality. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of 
rurality across Kentucky.  Most of the rural areas 
are in Eastern, South Central and far Western 
Kentucky.  
Figure 1: Kentucky’s Urban/Rural Landscape
Source: Author’s calculations from ERS Urban Rural Continuum Codes, 2003
Kentucky has persistently trailed behind its peer states in income and income growth, 
regardless of its relatively strong growth in the urban areas.  It appears that Kentucky lags 
behind because of slow growth in its rural communities.  This article empirically addresses 
the differences between the urban and rural counties of Kentucky.  There is evidence that 
there are significant differences in many socio-economic and quality of life indicators 
between the rural and urban counties.  In addition, while we typically classify Kentucky as 
either urban or rural, there is further significant variation among just the rural counties. 
Preliminary evidence suggests that the issues that plague rural areas, such as labor force 
participation rates, educational attainment levels, and lack of health insurance coverage, 
negatively influence the average household income in a county.  Changes in industry, 
such as the loss of manufacturing or mining jobs, did not appear to be significantly related 
to income.  Therefore, the results provide support for rural economic development policy 
to be directed towards the individual, specifically the improvement of workforce skills.
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II. Kentucky Demographics
Approximately 4.2 million people live in 
Kentucky.  The largest urban areas account for about 
2.4 million people; thus there are about 1.8 million 
residents living in rural areas of Kentucky.2  From 
2000 – 2006 there has been a slight outmigration 
of population from areas in Eastern Kentucky and 
Western Kentucky and a large influx of people into 
Kentucky’s metropolitan areas.  From Figure 2, we 
cannot determine if the rural residents are moving 
into the Kentucky cities or are instead moving out 
of the state.  
Education has always been considered the 
driving factor in economic growth in Kentucky. 
Many believe that implementing policies that would 
improve high school graduation rates would have 
an enormous impact on the incomes of rural areas. 
Of course, no such policy exists in any state to 
combat high school 
d r o p o u t  r a t e s 
because researchers 
cannot explain why 
e d u c a t i o n  r a t e s 
are low; without 
understanding the 
cause, it is impossible 
t o  a d e q u a t e l y 
address the problem. 
Figure 3 illustrates 
t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f  e d u c a t i o n  a s 
measured by the 
average percentage of 
individuals twenty-
five years of age or 
older with at least a 
high school degree. 
In Eastern and South 
Central Kentucky, 
there are numerous 
c o u n t i e s  w h e r e 
the  high school 
graduation rate is 
hovering around 
50 to 65%.  These 
numbers have been 
improving  over 
time, but many of 
the rural areas of 
Kentucky still fall 
short of the national average.  
Figure 4 provides an interesting depiction of 
the role age might play in rural economies.  The 
Western portion of the state, where agriculture still 
plays a large role in economic development, has a 
high percentage of older individuals (aged 65 and 
older).  These senior citizens are likely either still 
working on the farm or are retired.  The future of 
agriculture is uncertain when there are not future 
generations willing to take over the family farm. 
Also one can assume that many Kentuckians would 
like to retire where they were born, particularly in 
these rural areas of Kentucky where land and nature 
are at its best.  However, many of these areas lack the 
infrastructure to support a retirement community, 
such as health facilities and transportation services, 
and thus, at their current state, are not attractive to 
older individuals.   
Figure 2: Kentucky Population Change 2000 - 2006
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 – 2006.
Figure 3: Percentage of individuals, 25 years of age or older, 
with at least a high school degree
Source: Author’s Calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000
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III. Agriculture 
in Kentucky
Kentucky’s rural 
areas were at one 
time dominated by 
agricultural activity. 
Thus, when describing 
activity at the county 
level, it is important to 
recognize the role of 
agriculture in today’s 
economy.  In the past, tobacco production was 
typically a successful enterprise, regardless of 
farm acreage.  The livestock industry and the 
equine markets also contributed to farm income. 
The tobacco buyout initiated in 2005 changed the 
agricultural landscape in Kentucky.  The tobacco 
buyout program injected millions of dollars into 
rural areas as a result of land being taken from 
tobacco production because of changes in price floors 
and quotas.  The intended goal was to promote local 
economic development either through new non-
agricultural enterprises or other value-added, new 
agricultural opportunities in rural areas.  The results 
from this relatively new program on Kentucky 
agriculture cannot be identified until at least the 
2007 Census of Agriculture data are released.  In 
addition, because of the newness of the program, 
significant impacts on a county’s economy in terms 
of jobs and income changes are not expected to be 
visible for quite some time.
Currently, Kentucky’s top five agricultural 
commodities are3:
Cattle and Calves ($623 Million)1. 
Poultry and Eggs ($561 Million)2. 
Grains and Oilseeds ($518 Million)3. 
Horses, ponies, donkeys and mules ($491 4. 
Million)
Tobacco ($404 Million)5. 
Overall, a large majority of the counties (83 of 
120) either realized a substantial or moderate loss 
in agriculture, as measured by the difference in 
the market value of goods sold from 1997 to 2002 
(Figure 5).  All over the country, the age of the 
average farmer is in the fifties, and when they retire, 
there are not new farmers willing to take over.  Thus, 
counties that used to rely on agriculture for a large 
portion of their income must turn to other industries 
for job and wealth creation.  
Figure 4: Percentage of population aged 65 and older
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000
Figure 5: Change in market value of agricultural goods 
sold, 1997 to 2002
Source: Author’s calculations from National Agricultural Statistics Service, 1997 and 2002
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IV. Kentucky’s Economic Situation
As mentioned in the introduction, 
Kentucky ranks in the bottom 10% 
nationally in per capita income. 
Over the decades this ranking has 
not changed.  Regardless of the 
high growth in the urban areas and 
the moderate to slight growth in 
the rural areas, Kentucky has not 
been able to outpace its Southern 
neighbors.  Figure 6 shows a very 
distinct delineation of income 
regions.  Appalachian and South 
Central Kentucky ranks the lowest, 
followed by Western Kentucky and 
then Central Kentucky.  As would 
be expected, poverty levels follow a very similar 
trend (Figure 7).
Economists and policy makers 
have tried to understand the reasons 
behind lagging incomes.  The most 
obvious explanation was described 
earlier, the low levels of education 
attainment rates.  However, there are 
other factors that likely play a role as 
well.  One of the striking results is the 
labor force participation rate of males, 
ages 18 to 65.  This is considered the 
most likely subset of the population to 
be both in the labor force and working. 
Figure 8 shows that in many Eastern 
Kentucky counties, over 50% of men 
of working age are not considered part 
of the labor force.  In two counties, over 60% of the 
men are not part of the labor force.  This suggests 
that only 40% to 50% of men of working age are 
receiving a paycheck; others either have no source 
of income or are receiving disability payments and/
or public assistance.  
The business climate of any 
area can be measured in several 
ways.  For example, the value of 
manufacturing exports, the number 
of new establishments, and changes in 
payroll are all possible indicators.  To 
evaluate the entrepreneurial climate, 
the number of patents and the number 
of nonemployee establishments are 
measured.  
The value of manufacturing 
exports does not appear to follow a 
predicted pattern (Figure 9).  Eastern 
Kentucky and some areas of Western 
Figure 6:  Median household income
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2004
Figure 8: Percentage of Kentucky males not in the 
labor force
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000
Figure 7: Percentage of all people in Poverty
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2004
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Kentucky have very little if not zero 
manufacturing exports. Counties on the 
Tennessee border and the Ohio River 
have higher levels of exports as well as 
some of the urban counties.  Many rural 
counties did not receive a single patent in 
1999 (Figure 10), the most recent year of 
data available.  It is of little surprise that 
the counties with higher levels of patents 
per capita are in the metropolitan areas 
where the universities and high-tech firms 
are located.  In addition, rural counties 
have a smaller share of nonemployment 
establishments, suggesting a smaller 
number of entrepreneurs (Figure 11).
Figure 9: Manufacturing exports per capita
Source: Author’s calculations from Economic Census, 2002
Figure 10: Patents per capita
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Patents Office, 1999
Figure 11: Nonemployer Establishments Per Capita
Source: Author’s calculations from Economic Census, 2002 Nonemployer Statistics
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V. Kentucky’s Quality of Life
There are other factors that indicate the 
satisfaction of an individual living in a particular 
county or region besides income-related measures. 
These indicators include accessibility, transportation, 
crime, health, and natural amenities.  Figures 12 
and 13 provide a brief overview of how some of 
these indicators vary over the state and throughout 
different rural regions.  Commuting long distances 
takes time away from other activities.  Figure 12 is 
interesting in that it has several interpretations.  In the 
counties that surround the three major metropolitan 
areas, Lexington, Louisville, and Northern Kentucky, 
many individuals commute out of their county 
into an urban county.  Thus we expect that 
fewer people would be 
working in their county 
of residence.  However, 
once we move out to 
the rural  counties, 
m a n y  i n d i v i d u a l s 
are commuting out 
of their county either 
to work in the urban 
areas or commuting to 
surrounding counties 
because the jobs are 
not available within 
the i r  own county . 
Essentially, this figure 
shows that there might 
be a differentiation 
between necessity 
and choice.  Those 
who live near urban 
count ies  might 
have made the job 
choice first and then 
purchased a home 
in a surrounding 
county.  In rural 
counties, residents 
have chosen where 
to live first and then 
m u s t  c o m m u t e 
out of the county 
because of limited 
job selection. 
Another factor 
contr ibut ing  to 
quality of life is health status.  There are numerous 
indicators that measure health status: lack of physical 
activity, prevalence of obesity, smoking rates, cancer 
rates, access to primary care, and the percentage 
uninsured.  Figure 13 illustrates the uninsured rates 
across Kentucky.  High rates of uninsured can be 
found in Eastern and South Central Kentucky.  The 
problems of not having health insurance are two-
fold.  One, individuals do not seek preventative care 
and only visit a health care provider after they are 
already ill or in an emergency situation.  Second, the 
uninsured often visit public hospitals for non-life 
threatening issues and thus put a strain on hospital 
finances when they are unable to pay their bill.  
Figure 13: Percentage of individuals without 
health insurance
Source: Author’s calculations from www.kentuckyhealthfacts.org, 2007
Figure 12: Percentage of individuals working 
within county of residence
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000
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Variable Urban Average Rural Average
Demographic Variables
Population, 2005 50,498 16,401
Population 5 years in same house, (1995-2000 Percentage) 54.47% 61.95%
Population per square mile, 2000 221.76 61.25
High school degree or more (Percentage, 2000) 79.72% 67.30%
Aged 65 and older (Percentage, 2000) 11.70% 13.96%
Economic/Business Variables
People of all ages in poverty - percent 2004 13.22% 20.55%
Median value of specified owner-occupied housing units, 2000 $90,403 $61,925 
Median household income 2004 $42,148 $29,847 
Males not in labor force (Percentage) 27.72% 39.17%
Residents working within county (Percentage) 52.32% 61.90%
Federal Government expenditure per capita FY, 2004 $5,873 $7,164 
Patents Per Capita 0.000149 0.00003
Not in labor force (Percentage) 35.70% 46.03%
Receiving Public assistance (Percentage) 2.95% 5.17%
Civilian labor force unemployment rate, 2006 5.50% 6.80%
Manufacturing value of shipments, per capita, 2002 $18,760 $11,011 
Wholesale sales of establishments with payroll, per capita, 2002 $16,096 $2,293 
Retail trade sales of establishments with payroll per capita, 2002 $7,826 $6,852 
Working in White Collar job (Percentage) 27.09% 25.79%
Additional Quality of Life Indicators
Average travel time to work for workers 16 years, 2000 25.88 26.96
Uninsured Rate, 2007 (Percentage) 12.42% 15.92%
Drug Arrests (Per 100,000 population) 940 1089
Crime Per Capita 0.036 0.019
Mortality Rates (Per 100,000 population) 976.8 1051.7
Table 1: Urban and Rural Demographic, Economic, and Quality Of Life Differences
VI. The Determinants of Per-Capita 
Income: A County-Level Study
The previous section used many illustrations 
to measure the heterogeneity of Kentucky’s 
residents across all counties.  In this section, we 
measure demographic, economic, and quality of 
life differences between urban and rural areas. 
Furthermore, we breakdown Kentucky’s rural 
areas into “rural” and “very rural” to test if there 
are even substantial differences among Kentucky’s 
rural regions.  As would be expected given the 
figures above, the urban and rural areas exhibit 
very different characteristics (Table 1).  We will 
just highlight a few points of interest.  A larger 
percentage of individuals remain where they were 
five years ago in rural areas.  This statistic suggests 
that rural people are less mobile.  This result is 
not surprising, yet it does highlight the value that 
individuals place on their rural communities and 
that policies that are created to pull people away 
from home might not work as effectively as we 
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Variable Very Rural
(Beale Codes 7-9)
Rural Average
(Beale Codes 4-6)
Demographic Variables
Population, 2005 14,434 20,841
Population 5 years in same house, (1995-2000 Percentage) 63.84% 57.90%
Population per square mile, 2000 52.26 80.57
High school degree or more (Percentage, 2000) 64.7% 72.7%
Aged 65 and older (Percentage, 2000) 14.04% 13.78%
Economic/Business Variables
People of all ages in poverty - percent 2004 22.3% 16.8%
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2000 $57,879 $70,614
Median household income 2004 $24,609 $31,537
Males not in labor force (Percentage) 42.0% 33.1%
Residents working within county (Percentage) 60.1% 64.4%
Federal Government expenditure per capita FY, 2004 $7,710 $6,910
Patents Per Capita 0.34 1.07
Not in labor force (Percentage) 48.5% 40.8%
Receiving Public assistance (Percentage) 5.9% 3.6%
Civilian labor force unemployment rate, 2006 7.11% 6.15%
Manufacturing value of shipments, per capita, 2002 $6,852 $17,012
Wholesale sales of establishments, per capita, 2002 $2,019 $2,688
Retail trade sales of establishments per capita, 2002 $6,881.8 $6,870.8
Working in White Collar job (Percentage) 26.9% 23.4%
Additional Quality of Life Indicators
Average travel time to work for workers 16 years, 2000 27.75 25.25
Uninsured Rate (Percentage) 17.0% 13.6%
Drug Arrests (Per 100,000 population) 1063.4 1143.9
Crime Per Capita 0.016 0.026
Mortality Rates (Per 100,000 population) 1063.3 1026.7
Table 2: Examining Differences Across Rural Counties
would believe.  There are significantly higher rates 
of public assistance, federal spending, poverty, 
and unemployment in rural counties.  In addition, 
while drug arrests are higher in rural areas, crime 
is lower.
We were also interested in examining differences 
among rural counties.  We have seen that urban 
counties are quite different than rural but are there 
discernible differences between rural counties with 
rural-urban continuum codes between four and 
six (rural but could be close to an urban area) and 
those that are between seven and nine (most rural). 
Table 2 provides the averages for the same variables 
as Table 1 but for the two different rural areas. 
Using a difference in means t-test with α = 0.05, 
those variables that were found to be significantly 
different between the two rural areas are in bold. 
There are few surprises in the results.  In most 
instances the very rural counties are significantly 
more “distressed” in all three categories, particularly 
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Table 3: Semilog Regression Results
Dependent Variable is Log Median Household Income†
 Coefficients Standard Error
Intercept 9.4560 0.1471
Demographic Indicators
Population Change (%) 0.0055 0.0012
Aged 65 and older (%)* -0.0053 0.0031
High School Degree or more (%) 1.8723 0.1421
Economic Indicators
Not in Labor Force, male (%) -0.3746 0.1137
Manufacturing Per Capita 0.0007 0.0003
White Collar Worker (%) -0.2865 0.0988
Quality of Life Indicators
Commute Within County of Residence (%) -0.0024 0.0004
Uninsured Population (%) -0.0088 0.0029
Crime Per Capita 0.5550 0.2448
R2 = 0.9464
†  All variables listed are statistically significant with α = .05, except for variables denoted with an asterisk which is 
significant at α = 0.10.
when measured with economic indicators.
Successful rural economic development policy 
relies on understanding the factors that influence 
the targeted intended outcome.  In most instances, 
policy is created to improve the wealth of a region’s 
residents.  Thus, in the section, we will investigate 
what factors influence household income at the 
county level.  We will utilize the data in the previous 
section because all of these variables are expected 
to impact income, either directly or indirectly. 
 The results from the regression analysis are given 
in Table 3.  In total, there were 120 observations, 
one representing each county in Kentucky.  The 
dependent variable was defined as the natural log of 
median household income.  We will briefly interpret 
the results.  All of the signs on the coefficients for 
the three significant demographic variables were 
as hypothesized.  Population growth is typically 
a consequence of a region successfully attracting 
new residents.  Individuals of working age would 
likely only move to an area where job prospects were 
promising, thus we would expect incomes to be 
higher in these communities.  Counties with a high 
percentage of senior citizens are expected to have 
lower incomes because senior citizens are typically 
either not working or they are working part-time 
at relatively lower incomes.  Of course, areas with 
higher educational attainments are associated with 
higher incomes on average.  Small positive changes 
in educational attainment will reap relatively large 
income gains.
The results for the economic indicators suggest 
that the higher the percentage of males not in the 
labor force, the lower the median household income. 
This result was anticipated and is believed to be a 
very large influence on income.  Improvements in 
male labor-force participation rates are associated 
with higher incomes.
We expected that white-collar workers earn on 
average higher incomes than blue-collar workers 
and therefore we would predict that counties with a 
high percentage of white-collar workers would have 
relatively higher household incomes.  The results 
indicated that this prediction only holds in urban 
areas.  In rural areas, white-collar workers likely get 
paid below-average incomes for their profession 
compared to urban areas, as well as below-
prevailing wages in the blue-collar professions 
paid to workers in rural counties.  Counties with a 
high value of manufacturing exports have higher 
incomes.  This result was expected for two reasons. 
Manufacturing plants will likely hire some share 
of local workers.  The more valuable the produced 
goods, the higher the incomes the firm will be able 
to pay their workers.  In addition, manufacturing 
plants might also purchase some of their inputs 
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locally, thus infusing the local economy with dollars 
generated from a valuable export business.
There were three statistically significant quality-
of-life indicators: the percentage of households 
commuting within the county, the percentage of 
uninsured individuals, and crime per capita.  A 
county with a large share of households working 
within their county of residence will have lower 
average income, all else held constant.  This result 
appears to support the notion that out of necessity 
people leave their home county and commute to 
surrounding counties or urban areas for work; 
staying home results in lower incomes.  Counties 
with high levels of uninsured populations experience 
lower levels of income.  This variable could be a 
proxy for a quality-of-job variable.  Lower-quality 
jobs are typically low paying and often do not 
offer health insurance.  Finally, areas with higher 
crime will have higher incomes.  This result was 
not as hypothesized but this variable could also 
be measuring other indicators that might describe 
positive opportunities that you might also find in 
an urban area, such as high growth and quality job 
opportunities.
VII. Conclusion
In the past, we have explored Kentucky’s 
standing in relation to the rest of the nation and 
the surrounding southern states.  However, little 
has been done in the literature to examine how the 
rural and urban areas of Kentucky differ from one 
another.  We have always known that we have at 
least two distinct economies, the cities of Kentucky 
and the lagging rural areas.  This study examines, 
at the county level, the differences in demographic, 
economic, and quality of life conditions for urban 
and rural areas.  We further differentiate the rural 
areas by rural-urban continuum codes to explore 
possible subtle differences that might be useful in 
designing effective policy tools. 
In addition, we also investigate the factors that 
are correlated with household income at the county 
level.  This county-level study has not been done in 
Kentucky before, and the results reveal that effective 
economic development policies should target 
the improvement in both high school education 
attainment rates and male labor force participation 
rates.  Although it is uncertain exactly how to 
achieve improvements in both of these variables, 
we can conclude that there would likely be large 
payoffs to the rural regions of Kentucky in terms 
of higher incomes.  
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The Aluminum Industry in Kentucky
John Garen, Christopher Jepsen, and Frank Scott
I. Introduction
The aluminum industry has a substantial 
presence in Kentucky.  In general, the state has 
a larger share of its workforce in manufacturing 
compared to the national average (Sanford and 
Troske, 2007).  The aluminum industry is a 
major component of manufacturing, especially 
in Kentucky.  Aluminum products differ widely 
in their nature, their production processes, and 
their level of technology. Examples of aluminum 
products include aluminum door and window 
frames in construction, high-tech aluminum alloys 
used in airplanes, aluminum foil and packaging 
products, aluminum ladders and flashlights, and 
aluminum water bottles.
The North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) contains seven industry 
classifications related to aluminum manufacturing. 
Two categories deal with the production of 
aluminum.  In primary aluminum production, 
alumina is smelted to produce primary aluminum. 
In secondary smelting and alloying of aluminum, 
aluminum scrap, and usually some primary 
aluminum as well, is smelted and alloyed into 
aluminum billets and other forms of commodity 
aluminum.  The remaining five NAICS codes are 
for different aluminum manufacturing methods 
and products.  They are: (1) sheet, plate, and foil 
manufacturing, (2) extruded product manufacturing, 
(3) other aluminum rolling and drawing, (4) die-
casting foundries, and (5) foundries except die-
casting.
Of these seven industries, four have a substantial 
presence in Kentucky.  Primary aluminum 
production is rare in the United States.  Although 
Kentucky does contain a small number of primary 
aluminum producers, the number is too small to 
allow the government to publish state-level statistics 
on primary aluminum production in Kentucky.1 
These primary smelters have a production capacity 
that equals approximately 16 percent of the U.S. 
primary smelting capacity (Kentucky Cabinet 
for Economic Development, 2008).  Furthermore, 
these smelters have a workforce in excess of 1,000 
employees. 
State-level statistics also are not available for 
the broad category of other aluminum rolling and 
drawing, as well as for the category of foundries 
except die-casting.  These two sectors appear to be 
smaller – in terms of workforce and production – 
than the other NAICS codes (Kentucky Cabinet for 
Economic Development, 2008).  Therefore, we focus 
on the remaining four industry classifications for 
Kentucky.  In this article, we discuss employment 
and compensation; productivity and output; and 
safety for each of these five NAICS codes.  The focus 
is on recent trends in these areas.  The Kentucky 
Cabinet for Economic Development (2008) provides 
detailed information on the state’s aluminum 
industry, with a focus on the current status of the 
industry (as of 2008).
Figure 1 illustrates the presence of these 
industries in Kentucky.  Each of the five sectors has 
multiple plants in Kentucky.  Most of the plants are 
located near limited-access roadways (i.e. interstates 
and parkways), and several are located near the 
Ohio River.  Louisville, Owensboro, and Henderson 
have multiple plants located in or near the city.  In 
contrast, Lexington has only one secondary smelter, 
and the Kentucky suburbs of Cincinnati have no 
plants in these five sectors.
This article summarizes recent trends in Kentucky’s aluminum industry.  Data from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau show that employment and compensation in the 
industry have either held steady or declined in recent years.  A similar trend can be seen for output, 
although productivity has grown substantially.  Finally, safety statistics have no clear pattern.
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II. Employment and Compensation
Figure 2 shows recent trends in employment 
for Kentucky’s aluminum industry using data from 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  Although 
die-cast foundries were the sector with the largest 
employment in 2001, with nearly 4,000 employees 
in 2001, employment dropped to just above 2,000 
employees in 2007.  This decline in employment 
is matched with a decline in the number of 
establishments, which declined from 9 in 2001 to 
5 in 2007.
The sheet, plate, and foil sector has had 
relatively constant employment over the period, 
ranging from 2,200 to 2,400.  However, the number 
of establishments has declined from 9 to 6 over 
the period.  Employment is much smaller in 
the secondary smelting and extruded products 
classifications, where employment in each sector has 
hovered around 400 employees over the time period. 
The number of establishments has also remained 
relatively constant in each classification.
Looking at all four sectors together, we see 
that employment has declined from over 6,600 
employees in 2002 to approximately 5,200 employees 
in 2007, a decline of more than 27 percent.  As Figure 
2 illustrates, this decline is being driven by the 
decreased employment in die cast foundries; in other 
sectors, employment was relatively constant.
Unfortunately, monthly data on employment 
in these sectors is not available, either for Kentucky 
or the nation as a whole.  At this time, we cannot 
measure the extent of the effects of the current 
economic downturn on employment in these sectors 
of Kentucky’s aluminum industry.  However, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics has shown that 
manufacturing employment for durable goods, 
which is likely correlated with employment in 
the Kentucky aluminum industry, has declined in 
August and September of 2008, in Kentucky as well 
as nationally.
Next, we look at average annual pay in each 
sector of Kentucky’s aluminum industry.  Figure 3 
looks at trends in average pay by sector.  Average pay 
varied across the four aluminum sectors, although 
it was relatively constant over the period.  Average 
pay in sheet, plate, and foil grew substantially 
Figure 1: Aluminum Plant Locations in Kentucky
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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between 2005 and 2006 but was otherwise around 
$60,000 per worker (in 2006 dollars).  Secondary 
smelting pay hovered around $50,000 per worker, 
with a slight decline between 2004 and 2005.  Die-
cast foundries and extrusions had the lowest average 
pay, less than $40,000 per worker by 2006.  Both 
sectors had declines in average pay toward the end 
of the period.
In terms of average annual pay, workers in 
Kentucky’s aluminum industry compare favorably 
with average annual pay for all private workers in 
Kentucky or nationally.  The average annual pay 
for all private-sector workers in Kentucky was 
approximately $35,000 in 2007.  Thus, workers in 
Kentucky’s aluminum industry have higher annual 
pay than the state average.  The national average 
was around $43,000 in 2007, which is below each 
sector except die-cast foundries.
III. Productivity and Output
We now turn to productivity and output 
statistics for Kentucky’s aluminum industry.  Figure 
4 contains productivity information for the United 
States as a whole, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) – our source for productivity data – does not 
publish state-level productivity statistics.  The figure 
contains output per worker on a scale where the 
Figure 3: Average Annual Pay for Workers in Kentucky Aluminum Industry
Source: Quarterly Census of Wages and Employment, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Source: Quarterly Census of Wages and Employment, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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1997 level is equal to 100.  Thus, the statistics can 
be interpreted in terms of increases or decreases 
compared to 1997 levels.  The BLS reports data 
for sectors of the aluminum industry, “Alumina 
and Aluminum Production and Processing” and 
“Nonferrous metal foundries”.  In terms of the 
NAICS codes, the production and processing 
category includes primary and secondary smelting; 
sheet, plate, and foil, and extrusions.  The foundries 
category includes aluminum foundries, both die-
cast and non-die-cast, as well as other nonferrous 
metals such as brass, bronze, and copper.
The figure illustrates that productivity in the 
production and processing sector has increased 
dramatically starting in 2001.  In 2006, output 
per worker was 50 percent greater than it was in 
1997.  For foundries, output per worker increased 
substantially between 2001 and 2002, followed by 
a minor increase between 2001 and 2006.  Over 
the last decade, output per worker has increased 
23 percent.  In both sectors, productivity actually 
decreased between 1999 and 2001.  Thus, one 
possible explanation for the lack of growth in 
employment has been the increase in productivity. 
Aluminum manufacturers can produce the same 
amount of output with fewer workers. 
Next we study trends in output.  Again, output 
data are not available at the state level, so we look 
at national trends.  Specifically, Figure 5 contains 
information on value of shipments (in 2006 dollars) 
using data from the Census Bureau.  The data 
contain five categories of aluminum production. 
The NAICS code for extrusions is combined with 
the NAICS code for other aluminum rolling and 
drawing, although extrusions makes up nearly 90 
percent of this combined category during the time 
period when both categories are reported separately 
(1997 to 2001).  The Census Bureau combines die-cast 
and non-die-cast foundries into a single foundries 
category.
Figure 5 illustrates that the value of shipments 
has declined for most aluminum sectors since 1988, 
at least at the national level.  Sheet, plate, and foil 
shipments have increased in value since 2003; by 
2006 the value had reached the levels of the late 
1990s.  The value of castings shipments peaked in 
1996, declined substantially in 1997, and declined 
since 2002.  Extrusions have remained relatively 
constant over the time period, with a value between 
5 and 8 billion dollars.  Secondary production of 
aluminum, largely from scrap, has increased from 
4.5 billion dollars in 2003 to 7.0 billion dollars in 
2006 for an increase of more than 50 percent from 
2003 levels.  In contrast, primary production has 
decreased by half over the period, from 12 billion 
dollars in 1988 to 6 billion dollars in 2006.
IV. Safety
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recently 
began producing safety statistics as the state level. 
Therefore, we briefly consider the safety of the 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Figure 4: Productivity in U.S. Aluminum Industry
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aluminum industry in Kentucky.  Table 1 contains 
the illness and injury rate per 10,000 full time 
workers.  Again, the BLS has two categories of 
interest:  “Alumina and Aluminum Production and 
Processing” and “Nonferrous metal foundries”.  In 
addition, we report the illness and injury rate for 
all Kentucky jobs as a reference point.  The table 
shows that aluminum production in Kentucky 
has a much lower illness and injury rate than the 
statewide average for all jobs; however, the rate has 
been rather volatile over the period.  It was at 155.7 
illnesses and injuries in 2003, compared with 35.6 
in 2004.  By 2006, the rate had increased to 85.6.  In 
contrast, the statewide rate was between 150 and 
200 for all four years.
In contrast, foundries had a much higher 
illness and injury rate, both compared to aluminum 
production and compared to the statewide average 
for all jobs.  The rate for foundries was at 550.2 for 
2004, which translates into a rate of 5.5 percent.  In 
other words, an average of 5.5 percent of foundries 
workers in Kentucky had an illness or injury in 
2004.2  The illness and injury rate had fallen by 
half to 283.1 illnesses / injuries per 10,000 full time 
workers by 2006.
The right half of the table contains the same 
statistics for the U.S. rather than for just Kentucky. 
The illness and injury rate for aluminum production 
is lower in Kentucky than in the U.S. from 2004 to 
2006; in fact, the rate in Kentucky is half the U.S. 
average rate.  From this statistic, however, we 
cannot tell why the rate is lower.  For example, 
Figure 5: Value of Shipments for U.S. Aluminum Industry
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Kentucky U.S.
Year Aluminum Foundries All Aluminum Foundries All
2003 155.7 191 149.1 260.3 150
2004 35.6 550.2 183.9 115.7 282.4 141.3
2005 74.8 416.9 178 171.1 289.5 135.7
2006 85.6 283.1 150 155.4 253.2 127.8
Table 1: Injury and Illness Rate per 10,000 Full Time 
Workers in Kentucky and U.S.
Source: Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, U.S. Census Bureau
0
5
10
15
20
25
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year
Bi
lli
on
s o
f 2
00
6 D
oll
ar
s
Primary Production Secondary Production Castings
Extrusions Sheet, Plate, Foil
Center for Business and Economic Research 40
The Aluminum Industry in Kentucky
Kentucky aluminum producers may specialize in 
the production of types of aluminum that have 
lower illness and injury rates, such as sheet, plate, 
and foil.  Another possibility is that Kentucky 
factories have the same production mix as the U.S. 
average but for some reason have fewer illnesses 
and injuries due to better equipment, more safety-
conscious employees, luck, etc.  Kentucky foundries 
had higher illness and injury rates than the national 
average in 2004 and 2005, but Kentucky rate is 
slightly lower in 2006.  Finally, when we look at 
all jobs, we see that Kentucky has a higher illness 
and injury rate than the national average, and this 
difference has persisted in every year from 2003 to 
2006.  At the national level, illness and injury rates 
have declined every year for each of the categories 
reported in the table.
Although the illness and injury rate tells us 
about the likelihood of a worker becoming ill or 
injured, it says nothing about the severity of the 
ailment.  Table 2 contains the median number of 
days missed for the same set of industries and 
locations as in Table 1.  Aluminum production in 
Kentucky has a high and volatile number of median 
days lost, ranging from seven days in 2005 to 30 days 
in 2006.  With the exception of 2005, these numbers 
are much higher than the average of all jobs, either 
in Kentucky or in the U.S.  The numbers are also a 
lot higher than for the U.S. average for aluminum 
production.  Thus, even though the aluminum 
production jobs had fewer illnesses or accidents than 
the rest of the nation or than the average Kentucky 
job, the duration of illness or injury is much longer 
for Kentucky aluminum production.  Thus, the 
overall effect on total number of days away from 
work is unclear: fewer workers are away from work 
but, once away, they miss more days of work.
In Table 2, we see that foundries have lower 
median days lost in comparison to aluminum 
production or to the average Kentucky job.  The 
median number of days missed is between two and 
four days.  This number is lower than for aluminum 
production or for the average in Kentucky or for 
the national averages for foundries, aluminum 
production, or all jobs.  Again, however, the total 
days missed is unclear, since foundries have more 
absences of shorter duration.  Hopefully, the BLS 
will provide such information in the future.
V. Conclusion
Kentucky’s aluminum industry has shown 
mixed signals in the last few years.  Employment 
has held relatively constant except for a dramatic 
decline in die-cast foundries.  Average annual pay 
has been relatively constant, when measured in real 
terms, except for a huge decrease for foundries other 
than die-cast.  At the national level, productivity 
has increased substantially since 2001.  On the other 
hand, the value of shipments has decreased for most 
segments of the aluminum industry.
The data on safety in Kentucky’s aluminum 
industry is unclear.  Although primary production 
has fewer illnesses and injuries compared to the 
national average, the median number of days missed 
is higher.  Conversely, Kentucky’s foundries have 
a higher number of worker injuries and illness, but 
the median number of days missed per incident is 
lower.  
With the recent economic downturn, the 
near future for Kentucky’s aluminum industry is 
concerning.  Kentucky’s manufacturing employment 
in general has declined substantially in recent 
months.  Troubles in the automotive industry 
will affect Kentucky, as the state is heavily vested 
in building automobiles and providing parts for 
automobiles, including aluminum-based parts. 
The size and length of the downturn in Kentucky’s 
aluminum industry is unclear, but it clearly depends 
on the national economy and the manufacturing 
component of it in particular.
Kentucky U.S.
Year Aluminum Foundries All Aluminum Foundries All
2003 14 6 12 7 8
2004 11 4 7 16 9 7
2005 7 4 7 7 5 7
2006 30 2 8 8 7 7
Table 2: Median Days Lost for Kentucky and U.S. Workers
Source: Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, U.S. Census Bureau
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Introduction
This annually released report on business 
confidence in the manufacturing sector is the sixth 
in an on-going partnership between the Kentucky 
Association of Manufacturers (KAM) and the 
University of Kentucky’s Center for Business and 
Economic Research (CBER).  This study focuses 
on several performance indicators such as sales, 
employment and profit.  This year the outlook for 
all of these measures are at their lowest levels since 
CBER began producing the business confidence 
survey.  No more than a third of respondents expect 
to experience growth in any of the above measures 
and two-thirds of respondents expect either no 
change or a decline.  A continuing downward 
trend is expected for the manufacturing sector in 
Kentucky.
Data for this report represents the results 
compiled from the 2008 KAM Business Confidence 
Survey along with data from earlier reports 
based on previous years’ surveys.  The survey 
was administered in October and November of 
2008.  Surveys were sent to 2,085 Kentucky-based 
manufacturing establishments with at least 15 full-
time employees.  Businesses were asked to answer 
questions about their experience in the previous year 
and their expectations for the next year.  This year, 
over 25% of surveys (545) were returned.  While this 
is a substantial number of surveys it should be kept 
in mind that the results of these surveys are for a 
subset of all manufacturing firms and findings may 
not apply to all of them.
Our 25% response rate is a significant increase 
from last year’s survey where we obtained a response 
rate of 18%.  Also, the absolute number of surveys 
increased from 317 to 545.  Firms that returned 
the surveys employ over 56,666 workers, which is 
approximately 23% of all manufacturing workers 
in Kentucky. Ninety-two counties were represented 
in returned surveys, 77% of all Kentucky counties. 
The mean and median size of survey respondents 
in 2008 were 105 and 50 employees respectively. 
The largest firm had over 6,000 employees. The 
difference in the mean and median implies that 
there are a few large firms interspersed among 
the majority of establishments throughout the 
state – thus the typical responding firm has about 
50 employees.1  Responding firms reported sales 
of over 10.5 billion dollars.  Figure 1 shows the 
location of responding firms by Area Development 
District (ADD). As expected most respondents are 
located in more densely populated areas; the most 
notable concentration of these firms occurs in the 
“urban triangle” of Lexington, Louisville, and the 
Cincinnati Metropolitan Statistical Area. These areas 
are represented by the KIPDA, Northern Kentucky, 
and Bluegrass ADDs in Figure 1.  Responding 
1  Data on employment and sales are from the Selectory® data-
base compiled by Dun and Bradstreet.
The Kentucky Business Manufacturing confidence survey is produced annually through the 
joint efforts of the Kentucky Association of Manufacturers and the Center for Business and 
Economic Research. The survey asks businesses to report on their actual performance over the 
past year and to make predictions for the next year in areas such as employment, sales, profits, 
capital expenditures and industrial production. Among other findings, the 2008 survey shows 
the lowest levels of performance and expectation for the future in the history of this survey.  This 
is consistent with the downturn in the U.S. economy. Last year’s report showed an expected 
downturn in the economy, the first downturn in many years. But even the projected downturn 
did not predict the current decline. Problems affecting the overall growth of the state and national 
economy include the tightening of the credit market and a fall in consumer confidence. Given 
the current volatility of the economy, it is difficult to predict the economic environment for 
manufacturers and whether their expectations will coincide with the reality of the economy in 2009.
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establishments are also primarily located near I-64, 
I-71 and I-75, but a number of establishments are 
also located along I-24, I-65, Bluegrass Parkway 
and the Western Kentucky Parkway.  Thirty-six 
percent of respondents are members of the Kentucky 
Association of Manufacturers.
Manufacturing establishments were asked 
to report on their performance over the past 12 
months2 and to speculate about their performance 
over the next 12 months.  Respondents are asked 
about a number of different measures designed 
to capture their overall economic activity This 
report concentrates primarily on firm responses 
regarding employment, sales, and, to a lesser extent, 
profits, capital expenditures and productivity in 
their industry.  For each economic measure, firms 
responded by indicating whether they experienced 
either a/an “decrease,” “no change,” or “increase.” 
Likewise, the respondents chose from the same three 
options to express their expectations for their firms’ 
performance over the next year.  
The next section provides a general discussion 
about the economic environment of Kentucky’s 
manufacturing sector in 2008. The report continues 
by examining the recent downward trend in 
2  Establishments were surveyed in October, so the previous year 
should be treated as September 2007 to 2008 and the next year 
from September 2008 to 2009 .                                                  
economic factors affecting the industry. The section 
to follow further details firm performance in 2008 
and compares this to information about firms’ 2007 
performance. Subsequent are sections discussing 
firm expectations for performance in 2009. We 
conclude with a brief summary of the economic 
trends of Kentucky’s manufacturing industry and 
commentary on likely influential factors affecting 
the sector’s current performance and future 
prospects.
2008 Statewide Performance
Last year’s business confidence survey showed 
concern about the economy.  This year’s survey 
of manufacturers shows that they were right to 
be concerned and that the outlook for next year 
continues to be bleak. It should be kept in mind 
that this is a survey of business confidence and is 
reflecting the opinions of leaders of manufacturing 
firms.
In this report we focus on three areas of business 
performance that are of particular interest. These are 
sales, employment and profit.  In the 2007 report a 
plurality of firms experienced an increase in all these 
measures. This year decreases predominated in all 
three areas.  Also, for all three areas a significant 
downward trend is expected to continue in the 
Figure 1:  Business Location by Area Development District
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manufacturing industry in Kentucky.  Table 1 
reports the performance of each of the surveyed 
areas during 2008 for the Kentucky manufacturing 
sector.
To illustrate the changes from the previous 
year, Table 2 compares firm performance in 2008 to 
the previous year.  This table shows that for every 
measure of economic performance significantly 
fewer firms expect an increase while significantly 
more firms expect to see a decrease in the 
measure.
Another way to compare performance 
over time is through a diffusion index. 
This type of index is used when “No 
Change” is a possible choice in addition to 
“Increase” and “Decrease.”  If “Increase” 
and “Decrease” are the only options then a 
change in one implies a change in the other. 
If “No Change” is an option, however, 
a change in one does not necessarily 
mean a change in the other. A diffusion 
index allows a more direct comparison 
of increases and decreases when “No 
Change” is a choice by equally dividing the 
“No Change” responses and adding one 
half to “Increase” responses and one half 
to “Decrease” responses.  “Increases” and 
“Decrease” responses are then divided by 
the total number of responses to arrive at a 
new percentage. This percentage is then multiplied 
by 100.  Index numbers below 50 suggest a decline 
of the measure, such as employment and sales over 
the period; while values greater than 50 suggest 
improvements in the measure (an index value equal 
to 50 implies neither growth nor decline on net.)
Sales
Table 3 shows diffusion index for sales values 
across the Area Development Districts for 2007 and 
2008.  Thirteen out of 15 ADDs had values below 
50 points.
Big Sandy, Buffalo Trace and Kentucky River 
ADDs are among districts with the least density 
of firms resulting in less significant declines or 
insufficient data to calculate a value.  Similarly, 
the Gateway ADD is a relatively less dense 
manufacturing region.  So, while this District shows 
   
Table 1:  Firm Performance in 2008 
Decrease No Change Increase
Employment 48% 32% 20%
Sales 55% 14% 31%
Profits 58% 14% 28%
Capital Expenditures 33% 40% 26%
Industry Production 60% 22% 18%
Decrease No Change Increase
 2007 2008 Change 2007 2008 Change 2007 2008 Change
Employment 32% 48% 16% 29% 32% 3% 39% 20% -19%
Sales 35% 55% 20% 15% 14% -1% 50% 31% -19%
Profits 40% 58% 18% 20% 14% -6% 41% 28% -13%
Capital Expenditures 17% 33% 16% 40% 40% 0% 43% 26% -17%
Industry Production 40% 60% 60% 24% 22% -2% 36% 18% -18%
Table 2:  Firm Performance 2007-2008 Comparison
ADD District 2008 Index 2007 Index Change
Barren River 38 71 -33
Big Sandy N/A N/A  
Bluegrass 35 65 -30
Buffalo Trace 36 50 -14
Cumberland Valley 36 61 -25
FIVCO 50 88 -38
Gateway 23 25 -2
Green River 38 88 -50
Kentucky River 33 N/A  
KIPDA 40 77 -37
Lake Cumberland 31 50 -19
Lincoln Trail 24 65 -41
Northern Kentucky 44 85 -41
Pennyrile 42 71 -29
Purchase 40 75 -35
Table 3: Sales Index by Area Development 
Districts for 2007 and 2008
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an index of 23, this is only a slight decline from the 
previous year.  In districts with larger concentrations 
of manufacturing firms, such as the ADDs in 
Central and Northern Kentucky, the value of the 
diffusion index more likely reflects the average 
trend of the typical manufacturing establishment 
in the region.
Employment 
Table 4 shows the distribution of employment 
index values across the Area Development Districts 
using both the 2007 and 2008 data.
Twelve of the ADDs reported a decrease in 
employment (index value under 50).  One district, 
Barren River ADD, had an index of 50 indicating 
no change in employment over this period.  Since 
the Barren River District has relatively less of a 
manufacturing establishment density, however, it 
is less likely to reflect the actual trends in the region 
than ADDs with higher levels of manufacturing. 
The decrease in employment from 2007 to 2008 is 
less severe compared to sales.  This is in part because 
a decline had already occurred in the employment 
index in 2007.
Two other performance areas are also 
particularly illustrative, profits and industry 
production. In 2008, only 28% of respondents 
reported an increase in profits.  This is compared 
to 40.9% in 2007.  Similarly, respondents reporting 
an increase in production in the industry dropped 
to 18% in 2008 from 35.9% in 2007.
Historical Data
Figure 2 shows the performance of Kentucky 
manufacturers for the past 10 years using the 
diffusion index. Note that the survey samples for 
the years 1999 to 2002 and 2005 to 2006 include 
both KAM and non-KAM members.  However, 
the samples surveyed from 2003 to 2004 include 
only KAM members.
Indicators for 2008 for sales and employment 
are at their lowest levels since CBER began 
producing the business confidence survey.  This 
indicates the size of the economic downturn. 
Reports of a decline in both sales and employment 
are consistent with the downturn in the national 
economy.  In Figure 2, both indices dropped 
precipitously over the past year.  Similar to last 
year, the sales index remains slightly above the 
employment index. 
Firm Expectations for 2009
In this section we examine the firms’ expectations 
for 2009.  In 2007 we noted a decline in optimism 
compared to previous years of the survey.  This 
year expectations have dropped even further.  Last 
year still saw an expectation of an increase in sales 
for this year.  Something that, as noted above, did 
not occur.  
Table 5 shows firm expectations for the coming 
year.  All of the measures in the table show expected 
ADD District 2008 Index 2007 Index Change
Barren River 50 50 0
Big Sandy N/A N/A  
Bluegrass 32 61 -29
Buffalo Trace 33 67 -34
Cumberland Valley 35 61 -26
FIVCO 33 63 -30
Gateway 14 50 -36
Green River 40 79 -39
Kentucky River N/A N/A  
KIPDA 42 67 -25
Lake Cumberland 33 50 -17
Lincoln Trail 21 68 -47
Northern Kentucky 34 58 -24
Pennyrile 42 67 -25
Purchase 41 54 -13
Table 4:  Employment Index by Area 
Development Districts for 2007 and 2008
  Expected Decrease Expected No Change Expected Increase
 2009 2008 Change 2009 2008 Change 2009 2008 Change
Employment 38% 15% 23% 42% 45% -3% 21% 41% -20%
Sales 43% 17% 26% 23% 28% -5% 34% 55% -21%
Profits 44% 16% 28% 23% 33% -10% 33% 51% -18%
Capital Expenditures 35% 19% 16% 44% 45% -1% 20% 36% -16%
Industry Production 53% 24% 29% 27% 38% -11% 20% 38% -18%
Table 5:  Firm Expectations for 2009 and Comparison with 2008 Expectations
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decrease in growth.  The table also shows the 
percentages from 2008 
As seen in Table 5, respondents are much 
more pessimistic.  There has been a significant 
change in outlook for the near future.  Although 
expectations were down in 2007, there was still 
some question as to how widespread manufacturer’s 
pessimistic predictions were.  There is little room 
left for speculation, however, in the expectations of 
manufacturer’s for 2009.  No more than a third of 
respondents expect to experience growth in any of 
these measures while over two-thirds of respondents 
expect either no change or a decline in each of these 
measures. This is not unexpected given the recent 
downward trend in the economy.
This year the percentages of firms expecting 
to increase employment, sales, profits, capital 
expenditures and industry production fell 
significantly from last year’s predicted values. 
For employment, this reduction was a decline of 
20 percentage points, significantly greater than the 
previous years decline of 3.5 percentage points; for 
sales the decline was 21 percentage points; for profits 
the decline was 18 percentage points; for capital 
expenditures the decline was 16 percentage points; 
and in industrial production the decline was 18 
percentage points.   Similarly, the percentage of firms 
expecting a decrease in employment, sales, profits, 
capital expenditures, and industry production rose 
from last year’s expectations.  The number of firms 
expecting a decrease in employment in 2009 rose 
from 15% for 2008 to 38% and those expecting a 
decrease in sales rose from 17% to 43%.  Similarly, 
the number of firms expecting a decrease in profits 
in 2009 rose from 16% to 44%, in capital expenditures 
from 19% to 35% and in Industry production from 
24% to 53%.  For many of these categories, the 
number of firms expecting a decline more than 
doubled over the course of a year.
Additional Survey Questions
Additional questions were asked in this year’s 
survey to gather more information on issues 
pertinent to manufacturers.  The first question 
asked whether the company is planning to invest 
in capital in order to improve the efficiency of 
their production. In spite of the expected decrease 
in capital expenditures fifty-eight percent of 
respondents said that “yes” they were planning on 
making at least some capital investments to improve 
efficiency of production.
The strength of this response in these difficult 
economic times may come from a perception that 
the savings from efficient production techniques 
may outweigh the expenditures for the necessary 
capital.
The next questions related to the experience 
firms have with the impact of the policies of 
Kentucky State Government on their businesses. 
When asked if their business was being helped by 
Kentucky’s State Government 80% of respondents 
answered no, 20% yes.  When asked if their business 
was being hurt by Kentucky State Government 60% 
said no and 40% said yes.   Given that the majority of 
Figure 2:  Manufacturing Sector Performance in Selected Indicators
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firms responded that Kentucky’s State government 
neither helped or hurt their businesses may reflect 
a perception of manufacturing firms that their 
businesses are not largely impacted by Kentucky 
State Government Policies.
Conclusions
The results of the 2008 Kentucky Association 
of Manufacturers Business Confidence Survey 
show a sharp decline in business performance and 
expectations of future performance.  Last year’s 
report indicated that conditions were unlikely 
to improve in 2008 and this report has largely 
substantiated that prediction.
The sharp decline in expectations should not be 
surprising given the current economic downturn. 
Economic factors such as a tightening credit 
market and falling consumer confidence are likely 
affecting both manufacturing production and the 
expectations of manufacturers about future growth. 
The volatility of the current economic situation 
makes it difficult to say with any certainty whether 
manufacturer’s expectations will come to fruition.  It 
is unlikely, however, that a significant improvement 
in the economic environment will occur in the near 
future.
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